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BUDGETS AND DEFICITS: THE FEDERAL AND ONTARIO BUDGETS COMPARED

Don Mazankowski and Floyd Laughren are pursuing strategies that are remarkably similar by Fred Lazar

On April 26, Finance Minister Don Mazankowski tabled the federal government's budget in the House of Commons. This budget must be examined together with the economic and fiscal statement delivered to the House by the finance minister on December 2, 1992. Many have suggested that Mazankowski confused these two documents, because the December statement was indeed more of a budget, and the April budget was more of an economic statement.

On May 19, Ontario Treasurer Floyd Laughren presented his government's budget in the Legislative Assembly. A review of the federal and provincial budgets reveals many more similarities than differences. It appears that the fear of rising deficits and the threats of credit rating agencies have produced a remarkable convergence in the fiscal policies of parties nominally perceived to occupy opposing ends of the political spectrum. As well, these two budgets and those introduced by Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland set the stage for a finance ministers' conference to develop a comprehensive and cooperative approach for dealing with government deficits and debts and, more important, with the allocation of fiscal responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments.

The issue of jurisdictional responsibilities that was to be resolved by the Charlottetown accord on the constitution is likely to be eventually resolved through federal-provincial meetings on government fiscal arrangements and deficits. Constitutional reform is not dead. The actors have just moved offstage and out of the public limelight.

TWO BUDGETS COMPARED

Back to the two budgets and a look first at some of their differences. The federal government, after almost nine years of trying, has again failed to pierce the "mystical" $30 billion deficit target. Indeed, the deficit is expected to top out at $35.5 billion in fiscal year 1992-93 and decline modestly to $32.6 billion in 1993-94. In contrast, the Ontario government appears determined to get its deficit below its self-imposed upper-limit target of $10 billion. Although Ontario will fail in 1992-93, when the deficit will approach $12 billion, apparently it may succeed in 1993-94 when the deficit is anticipated to fall to $9.2 billion.

However, despite the apparent "success" of Ontario and the apparent failure of Ottawa, the picture is much different when we focus on the operating budgetary balances; that is, the budgetary balances excluding interest payments on the outstanding debt. The federal government continues to generate operating surpluses. Ontario, in contrast, will have operating deficits for the 1992-93 and 1993-94 fiscal years.

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THE FEDERAL BUDGET OF APRIL 26

Maz's tough budget fails to provide enough economic stimulus to get the economy back to its potential by John Grant

Despite financial commentators' disdain, I think this budget laid down a sensible track for the next government to follow — with one important exception. Certainly, it was tough enough. Since we are in the midst of a major shift to fiscal restraint at the provincial level, since the federal fiscal stance was already very contractionary, and since this government only has a month to get its measures through Parliament, realism suggests that we shouldn't have expected more.

And we should take note of the budget's projection that program expenditures would have fallen to just 13.9 percent of GDP by 1997-98, versus 17.3 percent in the year just ended and a high of 19.2 percent in 1983-84 (see chart on page 114). If the next government actually manages to do this, the economic impact of the federal government will fall to the lowest point in over 30 years, down 28 percent from its high. So this budget points the way to a hugely diminished federal role in our lives. Those who wanted more "slash and burn" have a credibility problem of their own.

For me, the budget fell short in quite a different respect. What I wanted to see was a commitment to...
getting the economy back to its potential — and it wasn’t there. Admittedly, this government can’t tie its successor’s hands, but this was its swan song, the place to recapitulate its aspirations. And what did it project? That the economy would not regain its potential level of output even by 1997-98!

Many forecasters have criticized Maz’s economic growth forecasts as being too high. They aren’t—they’re too low. Now, I do accept (though some would not) that the government shouldn’t tie the hands of the governor of the Bank of Canada in the battle for price stability. But GDP inflation is already in the 1 percent range! And since inflation reacts to the output gap (the difference between actual and potential output), and the current gap is a huge 7 percent of GDP, I think there is a real risk that inflation will fall below zero next year. So even the staunchest advocate of price stability should agree that Canada needs to close the output gap as soon as possible. In my view, a government that doesn’t put that front and centre is not providing the proper leadership.

We do have a tradition in Canada that ministers of finance practically never comment on monetary policy, but the government has already committed itself to falling inflation targets and ultimately to price stability. I have no problem with that, but if the government doesn’t think it’s possible to achieve price stability by 1998 without getting the economy back to potential, I certainly think it should tell us why!

For me, fiscal and monetary policy should be aimed most of the time at two medium-term goals: achieving price stability and (at least) stabilizing the ratio of public debt to GDP; both in the context of having got back to our potential GDP. If you work out the arithmetic, you’ll find that to do that by 1997-98 implies that real GDP will have to grow at an average rate of about 4.5 percent per year, and that the government’s borrowing requirement will have to be reduced to about $18 billion by the final year. This budget, in contrast, projects 4.25 percent average GDP growth and a final year surplus. In other words, we don’t get back to potential, but we do cut the debt-to-GDP ratio from 67 to 61 percent.

Isn’t this getting our priorities backward? Surely our primary target should be to get back to potential.
at the earliest possible moment consistent with maintaining price stability. If, in that context, we can get the debt-to-GDP ratio down sharply too (which I certainly believe we can), all the better. And for that matter, why couldn’t we do all these things more quickly?

The government’s fiscal plan has been hijacked by two big problems this year: a revenue shortfall on the one hand, and persistently high real interest rates on the other. Although there are some avoidance issues to be addressed, revenues will basically respond well to a stronger economy as we get back to potential. The problem of interest rates is a tougher nut, however, because it depends largely on factors beyond our control. The government has evidently decided that its best chance here is to cut the debt-to-GDP ratio and to encourage the provinces to cut theirs as well. The thinking goes that a balanced public sector budget would sharply reduce or even eliminate Canada’s need to borrow abroad, and that should give us our best shot at getting interest rates down. I do agree that this is a reasonable hope, and certainly it could enter us on a virtuous cycle if it works. Saving 1 percent a year on federal debt service would cut the deficit by $5 billion or so all by itself when it has worked through.

So I accept that we should set a severe fiscal course, but I also argue that the government and the Bank of Canada should make a clear commitment to getting the economy back to potential within the five-year projection period of this budget or sooner. Of course, this means that monetary policy would have to be sufficiently stimulative to compensate for the fiscal drag. But this doesn’t and shouldn’t mean that we need to give up on price stability. In my opinion, Canadians are unnecessarily and unrealistically pessimistic about their prospects at this time, and it wouldn’t be crass electioneering if someone were to lift their spirits.

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An overall balanced budget at the federal level will require a massive operating surplus, somewhere in the range of 30 to 35 percent of budgetary revenues. This will necessitate massive spending cuts, sharp tax increases, and record high sustained growth rates for the economy. It appears that part of Ontario’s fixation with its deficit stems from the fiscal morass that the federal government has fallen into as a result of its rising debt interest payments.

The debt interest payment projections in the two budgets provide an interesting footnote to this comparison of deficits. Despite an approximate 8 percent increase in the federal government debt in 1992-93, Mazankowski’s budget assumes that public debt charges will remain constant at $49.5 billion in the 1993-94 fiscal year. In Ontario, a 21 percent increase in its outstanding debt in 1992-93 is projected by Laughren to result in a 33 percent increase in debt charges in 1993-94. One suspects that both governments deliberately erred in making their interest rate assumptions. Ottawa had an interest in underestimating public debt charges in order to show some improvement in its overall deficit position in 1993-94. Ontario had an incentive to overestimate its interest payments in order to convince the broader public service of the need to accept the $2 billion expenditure reductions in the negotiation of a “social contract.”

TAXING TIMES IN ONTARIO

Finance Minister Mazankowski introduced his budget by claiming that it contained “no new taxes” and “no tax increases.” Floyd Laughren, in order to attain his deficit target for the next fiscal year and to persuade the people of Ontario that the necessary sacrifices would be borne fairly, resorted to a number of tax and user-fee increases. In 1993-94, the discretionary tax changes introduced in the budget would increase the tax burden in Ontario by about $1.6 billion. In addition, new user fees would generate another $239 million in revenues for the government. Moreover, excerpting a page from the Michael Wilson budget reduction strategy of off-loading to a junior level of government, the Ontario government’s proposed reductions in grants to municipalities, schools, and universities undoubtedly will result in higher property taxes and tuition fees and other user-fee increases. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mazankowski and the business community in general criticized the Ontario budget for its tax increases.

DIFFERING ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS

Finally, the federal and provincial governments seem to be looking at the future through different glasses. In its economic outlook, Ottawa ex-