"Uphill Battle," continued from page 1.

ments was that they displayed an impatience with her critics, coupled with a certainty in the correctness of her ownpolitical judgments that appeared to rival that of former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. These qualities were totally at odds with her campaign messages, which emphasized "inclusiveness" in decision making and the importance of "doing politics differently." Indeed, it was the very contradiction between her campaign themes and her published remarks that made the latter so revealing.

The good news for Campbell on this front is that she is now prime minister — and in this new role, actions speak louder than words.

What will count most from now on are the decisions and choices that Campbell will make as prime minister — rather than her lunch-time musings with inquisitive and apparently sympathetic journalists. And Campbell will have learned from her own bitter campaign experience that, in dealing with the media, caution rather than candour must be the watchword.

So Campbell should be able to overcome her first big challenge — the negative public image created by her campaign gaffes.

But Campbell faces a second challenge that is even more daunting and formidable than the first. Campbell must find a way to distance herself politically and symbolically from the legacy of the outgoing PM, Brian Mulroney.

It is not at all clear that Ms Campbell's natural instincts would prompt her to move in this direction. In her acceptance speech to the Tory convention on June 13, Campbell made a point of singling out Mulroney for special praise and recognition. She also referred to the challenge of securing a *third* consecutive majority government — a suggestive description indeed, since

it emphasizes continuity between the old regime and the new, rather than a total break with the past.

But there is no mistaking the fact that Campbell will have to present herself as the candidate of change if she is to avoid being relegated to a mere footnote in Canadian politics - alongside John Turner and his ill-fated 79-day ministry of 1984. That reality was brought home this spring by the different outcomes of the provincial elections in Nova Scotia and Alberta. Whereas Ralph Klein managed to distance himself from an unpopular predecessor, Don Cameron failed to do so and the election results reflected that difference.

CAMPBELL CABINET A PROMISING START

Viewed from one perspective, the Mulroney resignation and the choice of Campbell as Tory leader has already engineered a remarkable turnaround in the party's fortunes. In early February the Liberals enjoyed a lead in excess of 20 points. Coming out of the June convention, Gallup had the Liberal lead down to a mere 5 points. [For details, see the latest national poll results in the Month in Review on page 12.]

Campbell's announcement of her new Cabinet lineup on June 25 may well add a few more points to the Tory's standing in the polls, meaning that there may now be a virtual dead heat between the two leading parties.

Critics of the new Cabinet lineup pointed to the fact that most of the new ministers were holdovers from the Mulroney ministries.

But the important feature of the new Cabinet in symbolic and political terms were the numbers, not the names.

Campbell managed to reduce the number of ministers from 35 to 25,

Continued, see "Uphill Battle" on page 16.

WISHING AWAY THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: WHAT IF IT CAN'T BE DONE?

by Kenneth McRoberts

The presentation of Kim Campbell's slimmed-down Cabinet provoked a wide variety of comments. For many observers, the smaller size was itself a strong feature. But some lamented the decline in the presence of women. Others warned that the consolidation of responsibilities in new super-ministries, with mandates such as "public security" and "human resources and labour," was designed to reinforce Campbell's neo-liberal philosophy, cutting support for the needy and preventing the state from being an agent of creative change. However, there were no tears for one of the changes from the Mulroney Cabinet: the elimination of the minister for constitutional affairs. In fact, it seems that none of the major political commentators considered this change even worthy of comment.

Just two years ago the constitutional portfolio had been sufficiently weighty to draw (not without considerable prime ministerial armtwisting) the most senior of ministers, Joe Clark, from the most senior of portfolios, external affairs. Now there is widespread agreement that the last matter the Campbell government should concern itself with is constitutional reform. Nor is this attitude restricted to Conservative circles. If there is one area of consensus in the country as a whole, and it may be the only one, it is that the constitutional question should be avoided at all costs. Yet, how realistic is this?

THE QUESTION MAY RETURN

Before too long, the royal commission on aboriginal peoples will be issuing its report. As a comprehensive analysis of the aboriginal question and of the remedies required, how can it possibly avoid major proposals for constitutional change? Aboriginal self-government had, after all, been the one real breakthrough of the Charlottetown accord. Yet it would be difficult to modify the constitution to meet aboriginal concerns without Quebec's participation, which means accommodating Quebec's concerns.

For that matter, the Quebec provincial government must call an election by September 1994 at the very latest. Opinion surveys suggest that if an election were called now, the Parti québécois would have as great

"... the Quebec provincial government must call an election by September, 1994 at the very latest. Opinion surveys suggest that if an election were called now the Parti québécois would have as much chance of winning as do the Liberals... the election of a PQ government within a year is a very distinct possibility."

a chance of winning as do the Liberals. (The PQ's internal surveys predict a clear PQ sweep.) It is difficult to see how the Liberals can improve their fortunes in the coming months. In all likelihood, Robert Bourassa will step down before too long and the party will be forced to select a new leader and then mount an election campaign in short order. None of the mooted successors has the personal stature of Bourassa. In short, the election of a PQ government within a year is a very distinct possibility.

FEDERAL RESPONSES TO A RESURGENT QUEBEC

If, then, despite the best of efforts to wish it away, the constitutional question does once again impose itself upon the Canadian polity, how would governments be likely to approach it? In particular, how would they respond to a PQ government? Would they be prepared to develop an alternative to Quebec sovereignty: accommodating Quebec within a renewed federalism?

As far as Ottawa goes, there are, of course, two primary possibilities: a Liberal government or a Progressive Conservative one. Either of these could be a minority government, further complicating the formulation of any kind of coherent position on constitutional change.

The constitutional stance of a Liberal government under Jean Chrétien is easy to predict. It would be closely bound by the parameters of the Trudeau orthodoxy: absolute equality of the provinces, primacy of the Charter, no meaningful recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness. John Turner had no particular investment in the Trudeau legacy and thus sought to lead his party in support of the Meech Lake accord. But much of his party refused to follow. There is no danger that Chrétien would even attempt such heresies, as deeply rooted as he is in the Trudeau years.

A Conservative government is less clear cut, but only slightly so. On the face of it, Kim Campbell would be guided by the kind of openness to Quebec which had been Mulroney's suit. In her pursuit of the Conservative leadership, she looked to such Quebec nationalists as Marcel Masse and Gilles Loiselle for guidance. Masse has deep roots in Quebec nationalism, going back to a Cabinet position in the late 1960s Union nationale government

Continued, see "Wishing Away the Question" on page 14.

Kim's Prospects

Campbell will need to create an image of toughness, resiliency and decisiveness that we associate with male leadership, while never relinquishing a strong feminine image

by Robert MacDermid

As expected, Kim Campbell replaced Brian Mulroney as leader of the federal Progressive Conservative party and prime minister, but in an unexpectedly tight race. She must now lead her party, minus several Cabinet veterans and with many new faces both in Cabinet and as candidates, to a renewed governing majority. Her rapid rise to the top leaves a sketchy record and few clues on how she may perform in future. But beginning with the convention results, there are some known bumps in the road that she must pass over on the way to her own electoral success.

THE CONVENTION RESULTS

First, there is very little substance to the simple equation that connects winning margins at leadership conventions to subsequent electoral success. The past 11 Liberal and Conservative leadership conventions demonstrate that small (and smaller than average) winning margins at conventions can lead to indifferent electoral success, as was the case for Turner, Stanfield, and Clark, but small or even smaller winning margins than Campbell's can also be the start of careers as prime minister, as was the case for King, Trudeau, and Mulroney. Large con-

Bill C-133 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act

An Act to settle land claims within the new northern territory of Nunavut.

House of Commons 1st reading: May 28/93
2nd reading: June 4/93
3rd reading: June 4/93
Senate 1st reading: June 8/93
2nd reading: June 8/93
3rd reading: June 10/93

Royal assent: June 10/93

Note: The House of Commons recessed on June 16 until Monday, September 20.

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of Jean-Jacques Bertrand. For his part, Gilles Loiselle was the Quebec government's London representative in the early 1980s; he was remarkably effective in his efforts to warn British parliamentarians off the Trudeau constitutional package. Tutoring by Masse and Loiselle was reflected both in Campbell's attempts to project empathy for Quebec's constitutional positions, citing her own roots in British Columbia's historical estrangement from national politics, and in her attempt to avoid taking a position on the Quebec government's notorious Bill 178.

Nonetheless, Quebec nationalists will not have as privileged a position within the new Campbell government. Marcel Masse is gone. More important, authority over all matters dealing with Quebec has now shifted to the new deputy prime minister, Jean Charest. For his part, Charest has a vision of Canada that is closely reminiscent of Jean Chrétien's spiritual ancestor, Pierre Trudeau. After all, Charest comes from a similarly bicultural background. His hand was clearly revealed in his leadership of a parlia-

mentary committee that was charged with re-examining the Meech Lake accord during its final few months. Through a variety of changes, the Charest committee was so successful in recasting the Meech Lake accord in pan-Canadian terms that many of the accord's Quebec supporters were up in arms and the Mulroney government had to ignore the report. By the same token, when

"Ottawa's response to any resurgence of Quebec nationalism is likely to be defined by Quebec Francophones who are fundamentally hostile to this sentiment. In this they will have the firm support of most English Canadians."

the question of Bill 178 came up during the PC leadership debates, Charest launched into a spirited defence of minority language rights.

In the nature of things, a PQ government would have little interest in exploring routes for accommodating Quebec within the federal system. The leadership for defining an alternative to Quebec sovereignty would have to come from within the federal government. But with Jean Chrétien

leading the Liberal party and Jean Charest setting the tone for the Conservative's stance on Quebec, and the constitution in general, such leadership seems highly unlikely.

Once again, Ottawa's response to any resurgence of Quebec nationalism is likely to be defined by Quebec Francophones who are fundamentally hostile to this sentiment. In this they will have the firm support of most English Canadians. The Bloc Québécois MPs will argue for a different approach to the Quebec question, but they will be lone voices in Parliament. Next time around, the constitutional lines will be very tightly drawn indeed.

Kenneth McRoberts is Director of the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies and Professor of Political Science at York University.