



CANADA WATCH

Practical and Authoritative Analysis of Key National Issues

Canada Watch is a publication of the York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy and the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies of York University.

THE QUEBEC REFERENDUM: THE LONG VIEW

Part One of a Two-Part Series

by Alan Cairns

After a football game is over, all we need to know is who won and who lost. Referendums are not football games. While winning and losing are obviously vital, the politics leading up to the referendum, and the subsequent interpretations of the outcome, are also formative events in the lives of people.

A referendum on independence is a searing, profoundly divisive process that modifies our understanding of who we are—our civic and national identities are deeply engaged, with the result that social

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A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS FOR A FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE: THE DRAFT BILL ON SOVEREIGNTY AND QUEBEC'S POLITICAL FUTURE

by Daniel Turp

Whether people like it or not, sovereigntists control Quebec's political agenda and fully intend to make use of this situation. This was eloquently demonstrated on December 6, 1994, when the prime minister of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, in close consultation with the Bloc québécois, tabled a draft bill called *An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec*, that presents a blueprint for Quebec's political future and unveils the process that allows all

Quebeckers input into the finalizing of the text.

As might have been expected, the main thrust of this agenda is sovereignty, an option that Quebeckers have been debating in one form or another since 1960 and that has come to centre stage since the demise of the Meech Lake accord in 1990. The seventeen articles of the draft bill are,

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fault lines that remain below the surface in more halcyon times are likely to emerge, as in war time. The WWI conscription crisis, and its legacy, underline the long-run repercussions when competing understandings of our civic selves are not only brutally exposed, but are stimulated.

Even if the referendum is defeated we will not be the same people that we were, both within and without Quebec, before this latest bout of constitutional introspection began. This is a two-part article. This month's hints and intimations of what we might expect of the federal and provincial governments after a "yes" vote will be followed in part two by an article on our evolving civic selves: how the prospect of Quebec separation affects the "rest of Canada" (ROC)/ROC's sense of self, and how far Quebec has travelled on the road from ethnic to civic nationalism.

TWO CONSTITUTIONAL GAMES AT ONCE

For various well-known reasons, the governments outside of Quebec cannot publicly prepare for Canada without Quebec. The federal government is especially incapacitated by its role as the coast-to-coast government of all Canadians, and by its clear responsibility to those Québécois who wish to remain in Canada, from simultaneously preparing for Canada without Quebec. Its position is similar to that of the PQ in 1980, whose total commitment to winning support for sovereignty-association left it rudderless and incapacitated when the federalist forces won the referendum.

The PQ could not play and prepare for two constitutional games at the same time, especially when the second game of renewed federalism

contradicted its *raison d'être*. Similarly, for the federal government to play the ROC game while the federalism game is still underway and Canada still exists would contradict its primary responsibility and would produce a paralyzing split identity. It will also be difficult for the federal government to be the voice of the ROC in bargaining the terms of breakup with Quebec, as its credentials would certainly be challenged by some of the provincial governments. Further, its bargaining credibility would be suspect, given the recognition that it would be bargaining away part of itself. This reality adds cogency to the Monahan thesis that a federal government would not automatically accept a "yes" vote, would play for time, and would not quickly or easily give up on Canada (Monahan, *Cooler Heads Shall Prevail*, C.D. Howe Institute).

The natural strategy for the federal government in the buildup to the referendum, therefore, will be to float balloons questioning the constitutionality of Quebec's action, suggesting that 50 percent plus one is not enough (and citing the various polls indicating that more than half of Québécois agree on the need for an extraordinary majority), and underlining the legal case for Aboriginal nations to secede from a seceding Quebec. In brief, the federal government will multiply the legal, political and moral objections to Quebec independence. Such objections are the instruments of its own survival, and sustain a legitimacy it would lose if it tried to don the mantle of the voice of the ROC.

If, however, the reconstitution of Canada-without-Quebec moves from idle fancies to practical constitutional politics, the provincial and territorial governments will be key players. They will survive the exit of Quebec as the advocates of the provincial and territorial communities

that constitute one half of the divided identity of a federal people.

THE KEY PLAYERS IN A CANADA-WITHOUT-QUEBEC

At a time when a demoralized and beaten federal government is in serious disarray, when the battle for Canada is clearly lost, the capacity of provincial governments to speak for their people will be relatively unimpaired. In the buildup to the referendum, especially if a "yes" vote appears plausible, trial balloons and unguarded comments by provincial political leaders will reveal some of the centrifugal pressures that will powerfully influence the future shape of the one or more "Canadas" that will survive Quebec's departure. Accordingly, would-be futurists should be on the alert for hints on how those centrifugal provincial pressures will manifest themselves. Even if the No forces triumph, the simple possibility that the country might fragment will stimulate provincially based interpretations and anticipations of various futures.

The information to be garnered on what provincial and territorial governments are thinking about their future if Quebec departs will probably be indirect and fragmentary because of the constraints on public, official discussion of this possibility by governments. The requisite skills of outside analysts will have to be those that Kremlinologists formerly applied to Soviet politics.

Should any provincial elections occur before the Quebec referendum, the veil of official silence on the subject of Canada without Quebec may be shattered, and this may have spillover consequences throughout the country. The opening up of the Meech Lake constitutional discussions by the changes of government in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland is a useful, if imperfect, parallel.

CRACKS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSENSUS?

Those searching for cracks in the official intergovernmental consensus to keep Quebec in Canada should remember (1) that provincial governments are more likely to break ranks than the federal government, whose very essence is challenged by the Quebec independence movement, and (2) the most likely provincial candidates are the three "have provinces": Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta. The latter two combine wealth with distance from Quebec, and a more Pacific orientation, especially British Columbia. Ontario, in certain circumstances, might consider a separate deal with Quebec for two reasons: (1) its tight economic relationships with Quebec and (2) an appreciation that in a Canada without Quebec, its economic strength and population numbers will have to be significantly underweighted to induce some of the less populous provinces to join Ontario in a new founding.

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in this respect, a very able synthesis of positions taken by key actors in the recent debate relating to the sovereigntist option, as well as of studies conducted under the auspices of both the Bélanger-Campeau Commission (1991) and the Commission of the National Assembly established to examine matters relating to Quebec's accession to sovereignty (1992). The proposed process of consultation of the draft bill resembles that which was used for Bélanger-Campeau, and reflects a sincere desire to have Quebecers of all regions partake in the definition of a sovereign Quebec. This will be accomplished through the drafting of a solemn declaration of sovereignty that will serve as a preamble to the Act and a review of the blueprint for Quebec's political future contained in the body of the draft bill.

The draft bill comes as no surprise to those who have followed the contemporary process of determination of Quebec's political and constitutional future. This process has led Quebecers to believe that "should a final attempt to renew federalism fail, sovereignty would be the only course remaining" (Bélanger-Campeau Commission

Report, p. 73). For Quebecers, the failure of the Charlottetown accord now justifies a focus on sovereignty and its definition, rather than on federalism and its renewal.

Yet, such a course of action seems to have provoked an emotional response among the federalists in Quebec and the rest of Canada. They obviously have been shaken by the firm commitment of the Parizeau government to have the debate centre principally on its option, and have expressed great frustration at the fact that the main emphasis will be put on sovereignty rather than on federalism during the forthcoming consultations on Quebec's political future. This reaction is somewhat puzzling because the same voices a few short months ago refused to define a new federalist option for Quebec, saying simply that the burden of proof lies with the sovereigntists. The leader of the official opposition in Quebec and the prime minister of Canada have been very much on the defensive and have used loaded words such as "illegitimate" and "undemocratic" to qualify both the substance and the process of the Quebec government's plan. It seems, however, that these arguments have not had

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any significant effect on the Quebec electorate. Three consecutive polls recently have indicated a great deal of support for the Quebec government's initiative.


The federalists' great discomfort has led them to a hastily hatched plan to boycott the consultations that the government will be holding this year in February and March. For many sovereigntists, as recent polls show, this attitude is neither constructive nor wise and most probably underlies the fact that federalists in Quebec have very little to say about the political future of Quebec. As Mr. Parizeau put it in the National Assembly, their boycott is a pretext, a "faux-fuyant" for not participating and for preferring to hide their heads in the sand on this issue and promote the *status quo* as they have been doing since the rejection of the Charlottetown accord in October 1992. The Quebec Liberal party would also find itself in the embarrassing position of having to object to many components of the

draft bill on sovereignty that they have, in recent history, endorsed. For example, its leaders signed the *Bélanger-Campeau Report* and voted on the ensuing act, both of which constitute large components of the sovereigntist agenda of the new Quebec government.

Promoters of the *status quo* may sit on the sidelines and continue to question the legitimacy of the process or contemplate a parallel process to denigrate the sovereigntist option. Meanwhile, the Quebec government will be calling on the common sense of Quebeckers, confident of their capacity to debate positively the main features of a future sovereign Quebec and involving them in a truly democratic process. This process will certainly lead to a better understanding of all the dimensions of sovereignty; will shed light on the economic, social, and cultural aspects of the sovereigntist agenda; and prepare Quebeckers to make an informed choice on Quebec's accession to sovereignty. Quebeckers will participate fully and, one can predict, enthusiastically

in a very significant debate that the democratically elected government of Quebec has a clear mandate and responsibility to initiate before calling on the people to make the fundamental choice in a referendum on sovereignty.

And, moreover, Quebeckers will witness the solidarity of the sovereigntist forces, of the Parti québécois and the Bloc québécois, who have closely linked their organizations, and that together with their other partners outside the partisan political sphere will propose a clear sense of direction to Quebeckers. Together they will show that the sovereigntist option is not only legitimate and feasible, but also the best choice for Quebec's future, an option that will incorporate all the most positive aspects of modern democratic values, as we will see during the upcoming debate on the draft bill on Quebec sovereignty.

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EDITORIAL

CANADA'S POLITICS OF CATHARSIS

by Jamie Cameron

THE POLITICS OF CATHARSIS

The year 1995 finds Canada in the grip of catharsis. There has already been an international run on the Canadian dollar and momentum is building toward Quebec's separation referendum. Under the watchful eye of full diplomatic alert, Premier Parizeau sought a sympathetic hearing for Quebec independence in France. The Bloc québécois has asked to meet with President Clinton during his visit to Ottawa. Mean-

while, with the federal government maintaining a determined silence, the defence of Canada has been taken up by those who are equally determined that this nation should not "go gentle into that good night."

Quebec's separation referendum is presented to the rest of Canada as a simple exercise in democracy. It takes place against a backdrop of numerous failed exercises in democratic constitutional reform. In the circumstances, it is hardly surpris-

ing that Canadians everywhere are confused.

The referendum is Quebec's response to Canada's 1982 patriation and reform of the Constitution. With nine of ten provinces signing on, the patriation of the Constitution in 1982 might have seemed democratic enough. Except that, rightly or wrongly, the province of Quebec withheld its consent. Hence the "moral case for secession" (see Laforest's article in this issue).

The Meech Lake accord attempted to bring Quebec back into Canada's "constitutional family" through friendly amendments to the Constitution. Though all of Canada's democratically elected federal and provincial leaders supported it in 1987, by 1990 the accord would be robbed of all democratic legitimacy and would suffer a noisy and ignominious demise.

Then came the Charlottetown accord of 1992, an exercise in democracy run amok. There was something for everyone in the accord, and citizens voted on it in a nation-wide referendum. Though democratic participation was vindicated, the politics of inclusion resulted in yet another cataclysmic failure of constitutional reform.

Now Canada faces another exercise in democratic reform: this time, one part of the country claims to bind the others through the "moral force" of a vote for separation.

Such a prospect exposes deep conflicts and questions about the foundations of Canadian democracy. If Quebec votes "yes," in what circumstances, if any, does the rest of Canada have a moral obligation to respect that result? And what of the discrete pockets of Quebecers who have announced their opposition to separation? Can a majority of Quebecers claim a democratic prerogative for themselves that would then be denied to those pockets of aboriginals and anglophone/allophones? To complicate matters, the Inuit have announced their intention to conduct a referendum. Which result will have a greater moral claim on the rest of Canada, and why?

Few pretend to know the answers to any, much less all, of those questions. However, defining what we mean by democracy in the upcoming months is not an abstract exercise; it is one fraught with consequences

for the future. As the process unfolds, new questions are moving to the fore: how will the question be phrased? whose debate is this, and whose voices should be heard? should the rest of Canada participate in the debate on Quebec separation?

THE "INCIDENTAL MISCHIEFS" OF FREE DISCUSSION

In 1938, the chief justice of Canada declared, "notwithstanding its incidental mischiefs," that "free discussion of public affairs" is "the breath of life for parliamentary institutions." Though much has changed, the riddle of free public discussion remains.

"Quebec's separation referendum is presented to the rest of Canada as a simple exercise in democracy. ... In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Canadians everywhere are confused."

The question of who is free to discuss Quebec separation, and on what terms, has become a central aspect of Canada's catharsis.

In Quebec, one of the PQ's own consultants, Pierre Bourgault, was removed following remarks directed at non-francophone communities opposed to separation, which were widely described as ominous and threatening. A conception of separation as an exercise in raw majoritarian power was quickly excised from public discourse. More recently, allegations have been made that the PQ government has attempted to make Radio-Québec, a publicly-owned and independent broadcaster in the province, an instrument of separation.

Meanwhile, the rest of Canada, which quietly worried last fall during Quebec's provincial election campaign, has now entered the de-

bate, thereby dramatically raising the stakes. Prominent among its participants is Patrick Monahan (see his article in this issue), who claims that a "yes" vote would be so disassembling that the prospects of Quebec separation being successfully negotiated are virtually nil. Quebecers have described his *Cooler Heads* study as an exercise in terrorism and scare-mongering. Monahan's intervention has brought the conflict between Quebec separatists and Canadian federalists into sharp focus (see Latouche's article in this issue), and exposed divisions among commentators outside Quebec (see Hutchinson's article in this issue).

Nor is it quiet on the international front. After casual remarks about Canadian federalism caused a diplomatic stir, members of Parliament in the British House of Commons learned that they must henceforth practise a little self-restraint. Freighted with far more significance was Premier Parizeau's visit to France as head-of-state-in-waiting. Every step and word of this visit was carefully monitored by the Canadian government, as well as by the PQ and Canadian press.

The debate in upcoming months holds consequences for all of Canada. Precisely for that reason, it is important, whatever the future may bring, that debate on Quebec separation be conducted in an environment of free public discussion, incidental mischiefs and all.

COOLER HEADS

However, with the rising tensions of recent weeks, calls have been made for "cooler heads" to prevail. Unfortunately, there is little agreement as to what "cooler heads" would do in these circumstances.

Mr. Parizeau's version of cooler heads implores us to "hold our

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horses" and remember that it is in Canada's self-interest to respect Quebec's exercise in democracy—he believes that if the rest of Canada would behave rationally, then separation could be smoothly and amicably negotiated. To Professor Monahan, creator of this curiously Canadian aspiration, "cooler heads" means something quite different. In his view, it is precisely because the costs of separation will be so great that cooler heads within Quebec will realize, as a matter of *their* rational self-interest, that the game is not worth the candle.

Surely the arctic constraints of a "cooler heads" discourse cannot be imposed on a debate that promises to be hot as hell. Canadians inside and outside Quebec are far more likely, in the words of our as yet silent prime minister, to speak "straight from the heart."

Fasten your seat belts—it could be a bumpy ride.

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Canada Watch welcomes submissions on issues of current national interest. Submissions should be a maximum of 1,000 words.

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THE MORAL CASE FOR SECESSION

by *Guy Laforest*

Why should Quebec want to secede? What are its moral reasons? Isn't Canada already the most decentralized federation in the world, and the best country in the world according to the United Nations? Isn't it clear, as David Cameron insisted recently in *Canada Watch* (November/December 1994), that Quebecers enjoy liberal individual rights and that Canada is a truly democratic state? Are we not witnessing the hijacking of the whole citizenry of Quebec by the small, only 2,000-people strong (to borrow a figure from Laurier Lapierre), nationalist elite? These are huge questions. I shall try to give at least the contours of a reply to the first two questions, those concerning the morality of sovereignty and secession.

FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Donald Smiley had gained a great reputation as one of the most eminent scholars of the century on Canadian federalism. When his students and his peers decided to honour the York University professor with a collection of articles, it was not by accident that they entitled it *Federalism and Political Community*. Smiley knew all too well what was proper to do to one's fellow compatriots in a truly federal political community. To say that he considered improper what Canada did to Quebec in 1982, when the constitution was patriated, would be a remarkable understatement. As he put it,

... an exercise in constitutional review and reform [aimed at] ... more harmonious relations between Quebec and the wider Canadian community has [in-

stead] involved a betrayal of the Quebec electorate, a breach of fundamental constitutional convention, a recrudescence of Quebec nationalism, and an even more serious Quebec challenge than before to the legitimacy of the Canadian constitutional order.

Smiley's title, "A Dangerous Deed," and the title of the book in which this particular piece appears, *And No One Cheered*, are delightfully anachronistic. From Smiley we receive a crucial insight: it is plausible to argue that a major breach of federal trust occurred in 1981-1982 when the powers of Quebec were reduced without its consent. A federal community is governed by moral rules: the required consent of the constituent units when changes reduce their legislative prerogatives is one of those rules. Actually, it may be the most important one. My former mentor at McGill, James Tully, uses the following expression to refer to that rule, or convention, of federal morality: "What touches all must be approved by all." (In Latin, *quod omnes tangit*.) (See James Tully, "Diversity's Gambit Declined," in Curtis Cook, *Canada's Constitutional Predicament After 1992*.)

THE ARK AND THE COVENANT

Donald Smiley was not content to criticize the way in which patriation was achieved. A few years later he went on to argue that Canada's official language policies, enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, were "absurd." This, despite the remarkable progress in English-speaking Canada of what Peter Russell calls "Charter patriotism." Through the Charter of Rights

and Freedoms, which formed part of the patriation package, citizens have developed a new sense of national allegiance to Canada. But Smiley argued that:

In general terms, normative arguments which equate English in Quebec and French outside Quebec are suspect. We need here to remember the sound principle advanced by Aristotle that justice is treating equals equally and unequals unequally. The English language in Quebec has a number of important advantages The opposite circumstances prevail in respect to French outside Quebec. To repeat, the equation of the two official-language minorities allied with suggestions that the position of one should be enhanced or restricted to bring it into conformity with the other should be rejected. . . .

... Yet the Constitution Act, 1982 was put in place in the face of the opposition of the legislature and government of the province, and restricted the powers of Quebec in respect to the crucial areas of language and education. ("Language Policies in the Canadian Political Community," in J.W. Lapierre, V. Lemieux and J. Zylberberg, *Être contemporain. Mélanges en l'honneur de Gérard Bergeron*, pp. 284 and 290.)

The articles referring to language policies, considered absurd and unjust by Smiley, were not a minor dimension of the patriation project. It has been argued by Mr. Trudeau's biographers, Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall, that everything else in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was put into place to camouflage the centrality of those articles. The target of Smiley's criti-

cism is the very core of the Charter. Is there any evidence of this? It is well known that Mr. Trudeau rejected the idea of a "notwithstanding clause," enabling governments to subtract themselves, at least temporarily, from the effects of some sections of the Charter. But when political circumstances forced him to accept a legislative override, the resulting text drew a distinction between fundamental liberties, such as freedom of expression, juridical

"If the process leading to the 1982 Constitution was morally flawed, as Smiley has argued, and if the content of the Charter is morally flawed, as he has also suggested, then there has got to be a moral case for secession."

guarantees, and general equality rights, which are subject to the override, and language rights, which are not. There is, indeed, a hierarchy of rights in the Charter, and language rights are on the superior plateau. Why? I surmise that liberalism was not the only objective in the minds of the founders of the 1982 order. They had another goal: nation-building. As Tom Axworthy states:

The attachment of Canadians to the concept of a national community, and to a belief in the strength of shared values, claims, obligations and opportunities, is a fundamental objective of a nation-building quest. The Charter was the ark and the Covenant in the federal vision. ("Colliding Visions: The Debate Over the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1980-1981," in R. Elliot and J. Weiler, *Litigating the Values of a Nation*, p. 14.)

If the Charter was the "Ark and the Covenant" of the federal vision,

and if language policies are the "Ark and the Covenant" of the Charter and, furthermore, if those language provisions based on symmetry and uniformity are absurd, then isn't it fair to conclude that, for Smiley, logically, the whole patriation exercise and results were, precisely, absurd? Donald Smiley is not with us any more and, in his absence, I will refrain from going that far in the interpretation. However, to borrow a phrase from Richard Simeon, "Every student of Canadian federalism is one of Smiley's people." (*Federalism and Political Community*, p. 409.) As such, we have every right to interpret his heritage for ourselves.

If the process leading to the 1982 Constitution was morally flawed, as Smiley has argued, and if the content of the Charter is morally flawed, as he has also suggested, then there has got to be a moral case for secession. All the more so since the whole constitutional edifice has been transformed into a straitjacket by the rigidities of the amending formula. From the perspective of Quebec, the constitution now takes the shape of an impregnable fortress.

I believe that there exists, at the very least, a plausible case for the secession of Quebec from the Canadian federation. There is no need to go any further than this for the moment.

Guy Laforest is Professor of Political Science at the University of Laval. 🍁

CHARGES OF ECONOMIC TERRORISM ALLOW PARIZEAU TO AVOID TOUGH QUESTIONS

by Patrick J. Monahan

The response within Quebec to my recent study on the consequences of Quebec separation, while predictable, was also extremely disappointing. Premier Jacques Parizeau, when informed by reporters that the C.D. Howe Institute was claiming that separation would be an economic and political disaster, dismissed the findings without bothering to read the study. Here was another "economic terrorist" out to scare Quebecers into voting "no" in the referendum. Such threats are so far-fetched, according to Premier Parizeau, that they do not even deserve a response.

The Quebec francophone media, taking their cue from the premier, focused their coverage almost entirely on the denunciations by Premier Parizeau and Bernard Landry. The arguments and analysis in the study itself were mentioned only in passing, since the musings of an economic terrorist are hardly worth taking seriously.

QUEBEC PREPARES FOR A UDI

My study (entitled *Cooler Heads Shall Prevail*) essentially argued that the draft bill on sovereignty that was tabled in the Quebec National Assembly in December contemplates a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the province of Quebec. I argued that such a UDI would be illegal under existing Canadian law. (This point should hardly be controversial since virtually every scholar who has examined this issue—both inside and outside of Quebec—has come to a similar conclusion.)

I then argued—and here I am on ground that is admittedly more controversial—that Canada would contest the validity of a Quebec UDI. I claim that Canada would respond in this way for two reasons.

First, it is in Canada's self-interest to resist a UDI in order to ensure that Quebec separates from Canada only on terms and conditions that are agreed to by both parties. A key issue in this regard is responsibility for the Canadian debt. A portion of

"... surely democracy requires that all Canadians (including those in Quebec) have a right to know what is really at stake in the forthcoming referendum."

the existing Canadian debt can only be transferred to Quebec if Quebec agrees to accept responsibility. Absent such an agreement, the interest cheques from Quebec will be "delayed," as Premier Parizeau has already reminded Canadians on a number of occasions.

The second reason Canada would challenge a Quebec UDI is because the UDI must almost certainly fail if Canada takes a firm stand against it. Challenging a UDI does not involve the sending of troops or the use of force, as I demonstrate in my paper. Rather, it simply requires Canada to state that it regards the UDI as unconstitutional and of no force and effect, and that it will be "business as usual" in Quebec until further notice. The government of Canada controls the airports, seaports, key federal buildings, and all the entry

points into Quebec. The Quebec courts (whose judges are appointed by and paid by Ottawa) will likely agree that the UDI is unconstitutional and that the laws of Canada remain in force in Quebec. Even assuming some measure of popular support for the UDI among the general Quebec population, hundreds of thousands of Quebecers will certainly reject the validity of the UDI and declare their continued allegiance to Canada. (In fact, I expect that the vast majority of Quebecers, long accustomed to seeing their governments obey the law, would regard a UDI as illegitimate regardless of how they had voted in the referendum.)

As I point out in my paper, under international law Quebec must demonstrate that it is in effective control of Quebec territory in order for the UDI to succeed. The test of effective control not only requires that Quebec be able to enforce its own laws, but that no other government (that is, Canada) exercises jurisdiction over Quebec territory. It is difficult to see how Quebec could satisfy this test, absent agreement from Canada.

AGAINST FEAR MONGERING

Some Quebec commentators have labeled these kinds of scenarios as totally absurd and motivated by a desire to scare Quebecers into voting "no." If Quebecers vote "yes" in the referendum, it is claimed, the rest of Canada (ROC) will quickly agree to reasonable terms of separation. The ROC will act rationally and pursue a cooperative strategy because the costs associated with any other response are unacceptably high.

But this criticism misses the point of the arguments that I and others have been raising. My claim is precisely that the ROC will react rationally in the face of a "yes" vote—but that "rationality" in this context

means acting in the ROC's own self-interest, rather than in the interests of Quebec. In particular, the ROC will insist that Quebec can secede only on the basis of terms and conditions that are acceptable to both parties—rather than through a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec (as Mr. Parizeau's draft bill contemplates). Far from being "irrational," this insistence on joint terms and conditions is simply a natural response to the aggressive negotiating position taken by Premier Parizeau in the draft sovereignty bill.

As for the suggestion that raising this argument is somehow "undemocratic," surely democracy requires that all Canadians (including those

in Quebec) have a right to know what is really at stake in the forthcoming referendum. Otherwise, citizens are left to make a fundamental choice about their future without a clear understanding of the likely consequences. In fact, it is those who seek to suppress a full and open debate through charges of "economic terrorism" who are the real elitists, since they assume that ordinary citizens will be incapable of making an informed judgment if they are exposed to arguments on both sides of the issue.

I remain convinced that all Canadians have an obligation to debate openly the real costs and consequences of Quebec separation. But this, of course, cannot be the whole

debate. We also need to respond to Quebec's legitimate aspirations—as well as those of other provinces—by providing greater room in our federation for provincial autonomy within areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. The fiscal pressures facing the federal government seem to make such an accommodation inevitable, which is a fortunate coincidence. It is also a reason for assuming that, in the end, cooler heads will, indeed, prevail in Quebec City as well as in Ottawa in this debate.

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THE NEW KINGMAKERS

by Daniel Latouche

Doomsday scenarios, such as Patrick Monahan's *Cooler Heads Shall Prevail*, are no strangers to the Canadian way of doing things. In fact, the country was founded following the "mother of all scenarios": a possible invasion by a restless post-Civil War America. We have had similar periods of intense scenario-making in recent years: at the time of the FLQ crisis, when the Parti québécois first took power in 1976; during the free trade debate of the late 1980s; and, more recently, following the Meech debacle. We are now witnessing the fifth wave of cataclysmic scenario writing.

On the whole, the intellectual legitimacy and the scientific credibility of these scenarios has been somewhat limited and all indications are that the present vintage of "what-if" exercises will not be much better. One of the reasons, of course, is that most scenario makers do not actually believe in their product or even

in the probable occurrence of the triggering event, in this case a "yes" vote in the upcoming Quebec referendum. Their scenarios are to be seen strictly as contributing to the propaganda war as performed by well-intentioned intellectual mercenaries who take quite literally the necessity to "stand on guard for thee."

This is not to say that such exercises are futile; they are actually quite effective as ideological tools, but their main value lies in what they tell us about the country and its own political foundations.

It should be noted that all such scenarios agree that the reason for the coming cataclysm is Quebec and its insistence on remodeling the political configuration of this part of North America. Throughout the analysis, Canada (also known as the "rest of Canada" (ROC)) is usually presented as a somewhat tranquil, a bit naive, and always sympathetic

partner who could soon be confronted with a host of demands for which it is not responsible and which are likely to induce irrational reactions. In any case, the ROC is not to be held responsible for any such reactions because Quebec leaves it no choice but to succumb to its fears of the unknown.

While Canada is pictured as the helpless "male" partner, Quebec is seen as the "female" accomplice, one whose own "illogical" behaviour is likely to bring turmoil to the relationship. Quebec, it seems, needs to be told ahead of time that any set of unrealistic demands will not be met, not so much because demands are unfounded, but simply because the "male" partner is not psychologically equipped to deal rationally with them. Such warnings are seen as serving two purposes: first, to bring some sense to the "other" side,

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and second, to convince "your" side that if the worst ever comes, all manner of reactions will be acceptable, for Quebec will have been warned.

For obvious political reasons, Quebec federalists are unlikely to criticize these exercises. At best, they will be rejected as being "unproductive," but in private, most Quebecers will be offended by their incredibly paternalistic and chauvinistic orientation.

Scenarios such as Monahan's are of the "cease and desist" variety, inasmuch as they offer Quebec only one way out—that is, to quit while it's ahead, otherwise the rest of the country cannot be held responsible for what it might be forced to do. Thus, if the worst comes, it will be entirely Quebec's fault and the separatists will only have themselves to blame. No other cure, except for Jacques Parizeau abandoning his futile and dangerous idea, is likely to be considered. For example, English Canadian scenario writers would not even think of suggesting that the rest of the country get its act together and start thinking about the best way out of a potentially disturbing situation. For Patrick Monahan, the state of non-preparation in which Canada now finds itself is to be taken at face value. It is presumed to be the normal state of things in Canada, one in which Canadians and their leaders find themselves most comfortable. Never is it suggested that this state of "non-preparation" is actually the source of the problem and should be changed. Of course, the mere idea that a "yes" vote could be engaged positively and could actually be the starting point of a new Canada is never even considered. Such an anti-climactic scenario is seen as giving comfort to the enemy and rejected as only serv-

ing the interests of the separatists.

This position is not only strategically indefensible, but can also be questioned from a moral and democratic perspective. It is based on the idea that in certain circumstances, democratically elected governments, in this case the federal and the other nine provincial ones, are justified in not preparing themselves for a potentially disturbing situation, lest they are seen as considering this event a likely one. Of course, there is always the possibility that this state of unreadiness is but a mixture of talk and posturing, in which case these governments are clearly lying, a fact that does not augur well for the pursuit of a democratic dialogue in

"... English Canadian scenario writers would not even think of suggesting that the rest of the country get its act together and start thinking about the best way out of a potentially disturbing situation."


Canada. Is this, indeed, the Canadian version of the "talk loud and carry a big stick" ideology of our neighbours to the south? But if nothing is being done in our various capitals, this tells us much about the seriousness that guides Canadian governments. Canadian taxpayers, including those living in Quebec—even the separatists ones—are entitled to a better performance from their elected officials. Their *raison d'être* is precisely to think about the unthinkable. To prepare for the obvious is easy enough. We only need newspapers to do so.

One could even argue that by refusing to prepare for the unthinkable, Canadian elected officials are behaving in an unconstitutional manner. Is it not the case that "peace, order, and good government" is the moral foundation on which the Ca-

nadian political order is based? By refusing to consider and prepare for a Yes victory, could we not say that these officials are operating outside the realm of the constitutionally acceptable?

In this country it is clearly unacceptable, as well as illegal, to promote change or, for that matter, any set of political and social ideas through the use of violence. To advocate violence, as the old FLQ once did, clearly puts you outside the boundaries of what a normal democratic society can tolerate. Of course, the Group of Eleven and the scenario helpers are not advocating such extreme measures, but by refusing to state unequivocally that under no circumstances will they tolerate the use of violence or military intervention to "keep Quebec in," are they not laying the ground work for such a course of action?

Is this what Canada is all about? Why are so few raising their voices to affirm that they will have no part in this self-fulfilling undemocratic behaviour? Is such a country worth saving?

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MONAHAN'S CONSTITUTION: DEAD BRANCH OR LIVING TREE?

by Allan C. Hutchinson

Constitutional lawyers are much like weather forecasters—both are in the dubious game of predicting the future on the basis of the past. As often wrong as they are right, they hope that authoritative accents will make up for their intrinsic insecurity and uncertainty. Like the weather, constitutional law follows certain trends, but is impossible to predict on any particular day or issue.

Who could have guessed the unfolding of the repatriation drama in 1982 and the pivotal role of the Supreme Court? By what measuring rod could the eventual resolution of the federal government's anti-inflation program in the 1970s or unemployment legislation in the 1930s be predicted?

If his paper for the C.D. Howe Institute, *Cooler Heads Shall Prevail: Assessing the Costs and Consequences of Quebec Separation*, is anything to go by, Patrick Monahan considers himself blessed with the rare gift of constitutional prescience. Discussing the possible secession of Quebec, he confidently asserts that "secession can be legally accomplished under the existing Constitution only if it is approved by all the other partners in the federation."

He reaches this conclusion with hardly a shred of doubt or qualification. He offers it not as an opinion, but instead as a seemingly incontrovertible statement of constitutional fact. He depicts law as "a brooding omnipresence in the sky" that speaks in a clear and precise voice to those possessed of the appropriate expert hearing. There is almost no reference to Canada's rich and stormy constitutional past.

While Monahan's assessment of the constitutional context is not without considerable merit or cogency, he is informed enough to know that only one certainty can be predicted about Canadian constitutional law—its enduring uncertainty and pervasive unpredictability. At the hands of its judicial interlocutors, the whole history of constitutional law is one of discontinuity, U-turns, contortions, and backflips.

For instance, in 1980, almost no constitutional lawyers predicted that the Supreme Court would hold that constitutional convention required that re-patriation could not occur without substantial provincial consent. Canadian judges have a penchant for overlooking what is on the written face of the constitutional text when it is expedient to do so and, equally important, reading in what is not textually obvious when it suits their purposes.

Monahan incorrectly treats the constitutional living tree as if it had died, carbonized, and been reduced to a tablet of stone—inert, unchanging and inflexible. However, constitutional law is not exclusively about the careful parsing of formal legal documents; it is a dynamic exercise in political judgment. Whether dealing with liquor licensing, black marketeering, resource taxes, unemployment insurance, anti-inflation measures, aboriginal claims, repatriation, or racist legislation, the courts have shown a willing capacity to rain on the constitutional experts' parade.

Of course, the courts are not always on the side of the constitutional angels: there are as many ob-

structive decisions as facilitative ones. But, more like the weather than the forecasters, judges have been prepared to sense the force and direction of the political winds that blow. What Monahan says about politics is as true for law—"political events, once set in motion, rarely unfold according to a predetermined script."

Unlike Monahan's analysis, the courts have been willing to recognize that political realities can and should intrude on constitutional analysis. Ultimately, judges recognize that the law's legitimacy is fragile and can only be sustained through, and not in spite of, general approval and public support. Popular sovereignty is the source of the constitution's authority, not its result.

There is no predicting how the courts will respond to efforts by Quebec to go it alone. Political necessity is the mother of judicial invention. For example, there is no telling if the fact that Quebec was part of the 1982 constitutional compact—not only without its consent, but with its express dissent—will or will not loom large in any future judicial pronouncements.

Nevertheless, it is what Monahan leaves largely unsaid that is as significant as what he actually says. What hangs on these sweeping declarations about this or that manoeuvre's constitutionality? What follows from the pronouncement that something is unconstitutional? For Monahan, the answer is somehow important and decisive.

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However, if history is any guide, the more authentic answer is that absolutely nothing necessarily follows or happens. Political realities tend to obscure constitutional niceties. Whether it is about resource taxes, language laws, or inter-governmental delegation, "unconstitutionality" is simply one more card to be played in the larger game of political power. Ironically, one of the best studies of this is Monahan's earlier *Politics and the Constitution*.

But the rhetorical effect of "unconstitutionality" ought not to be underestimated. Although Monahan declares its eventuality to be "extremely unlikely," there seems to be the veiled threat that Quebec's resolve to act unconstitutionally (and without the support of international law) might force the federal government's hand and justify, at least, the threat of military intervention.

Indeed, Monahan seems to suggest that constitutional propriety might actually mandate such intervention in order to fulfill the existing constitutional responsibility to

the First Nations. The reliance by the federal government on such a duty seems ironic, at best, and downright self-serving, at worst, in the light of its past attitude and actions toward Canada's aboriginal population.

Of course, Monahan is chillingly correct when he concludes that the costs and consequences of Quebec's separation are very high. But he seems to be impervious to the fact that it is commentators, like him, that insist on raising the stakes so high and making the consequences so drastic—strategic sensationalists passing themselves off as hard-headed realists.


The more commentators and experts persist in telling Quebec that it cannot do this or that, the more likely Quebec is to treat such opinion as a partisan challenge to its resolve than a constructive contribution to resolution. Monahan manages to make an olive branch look a lot like a billy club.

The better and more democratic tack is for commentators and experts to use their collective ingenuity and insight to suggest ways in

which Quebec and the rest of Canada can separate with a minimum of political disruption and economic upheaval. In this way, Quebec might be more tempted to view such initiatives as a genuine act of good faith and reconsider its determination to secede. Carrots are always better than sticks.

In the contest between legality and democracy, the constitutionally empowered courts know where their allegiance must lie. In the light of a "Oui" vote in any future Quebec referendum, it would be a foolish court of judges that closed its legal ears to such a resounding democratic voice. And there is no historical evidence for that kind of judicial naiveté.

If *prevailing heads would cool*, cool heads might have a chance to prevail. And constitutional pundits might concede that, unlike their meteorological colleagues, their forecasts can and do have an effect (for bad as well as good) on the constitutional climate.

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THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OF THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD

by Harry Glasbeek

When the Charlottetown Accord was defeated by the people, the politicians who had hoisted their flags to the passage of the Accord did not seem to be eager to assume that it was their ineptness, their undemocratic arrogance, and their paternalism, which had led to the rejection of their proposals. Rather, they put it down to a sort of country-wide constitutional fatigue, to the fact that the people of Quebec, Canada, and of the First Nations were sick and tired

of being presented with abstract concepts couched in hard-to-penetrate legal language. Therefore, said these unrepentant politicians, they would now bend their efforts toward addressing what the people really wanted to have their governments do—that is, deal with concrete economic problems. Under this rubric they set out to implement the unfinished economic agenda of the Charlottetown accord.

Capital already had made great

gains at the expense of the state in recent years. From a constitutional perspective, the conclusion of the FTA and the NAFTA and the Uruguay-GATT round meant that the federal government (and through it, the provincial ones) had agreed to give up massive amounts of its right to manage trade and to use its power to create a universal social wage and social net although, in a narrow legalistic way, it remains constitutionally empowered to do so. Cor-

porate Canada, of course, never argues that it stands for the dismantling of state powers. But, when the constitution negotiations are put into motion, dominant business interests are right there to push their agenda. The Charlottetown accord evidences this.

The accord contained a business proposal for a new section 91A that would have established an unelected council of the federation whose role was to be to monitor governments' policies and to ensure "the efficient functioning of the economic union" in which zero inflation was to be a goal. This proposal was so clearly intended to be a usurpation of constitutional powers that it was too crass and had to be taken off the table.

But all over the advanced capitalist world, a wedge has been driven between central banks and government, emphasizing the autonomy of the bank. The intention is to make it very difficult for an elected government to control monetary policies. This makes a nation state far more subject to the whims and caprices of international capital.

The struggle that led to the successful claim of independence by super inflation fighter John Crow (note that his holy grail of zero inflation was part and parcel of the Charlottetown accord proposal) is well known. The independence of the Bank of Canada, that is, the dependence of an elected government, was made manifest when Crow was allowed to put his nominee into the post he had just vacated. The Bank of Canada is fast becoming a useful, if not complete, surrogate for the council of federation.

The Charlottetown accord also contained a provision to expand section 121 of the constitution. Capital had been disappointed that the section had been limited to catching those economic measures that acted

as barriers between the provinces; it had not been implemented so as to catch those measures that regulated the marketplace within the provinces. The Charlottetown accord proposed to remedy this "anti-business" approach. This has been done despite the defeat of the Charlottetown accord.

The Internal Trade Agreement, signed by the federal government and provinces in July 1994, provides for much greater integration than the Canadian federation had ever permitted by limiting (1) the provinces' right to engage in discriminatory practices with respect to government procurement, (2) their regulation of professions and trades, and (3) their powers to set product standards. Of course, this is merely a political accord, not a formal constitutional rearrangement. But, it is a *fait accompli* and has curtailed the powers of the provinces and of the federal entity.

From capital's perspective, the centre of the Charlottetown accord was the creation of an *economic* union that would make its apparent offer of regional *political* experimentation and sovereignty an empty one. That this was a goal of the corporate agenda cannot be doubted. The creation of a common market by extension of section 121 of the Constitution and other such mechanisms long has been on the academic agenda of right wing academics, such as Trebilcock, Pritchard, Courchene, and Whalley (1983), and politicians, think-tanks, and commissions, such as the C.D. Howe Institute (1991), and the Canadian Bar Association (1978). Old support is found in the P  pin-Robarts Report (1979), the Liberal party of Quebec's beige paper (1988), a Federal Liberal party proposal (Chr  tien, 1980), the MacDonald Commission on Economic Union, and even in the Allaire Report. And now, before this round

of negotiations is really under way, further economic integration and effectively weakened popular democracy, intended to be included in the Charlottetown accord by business, has been embedded.

IMPLICATIONS

As the politics of the Quebec referendum are heating up, the state of play is:

- 1) The conclusion of the FTA and the NAFTA and the Uruguay round of GATT and the functional implementation of much of capital's Charlottetown agenda, added to the Charter of Rights and Freedom's legal and ideological check on state-majoritarian regulatory power, have enhanced the sovereignty of capital. The threat of the capital strike has become increasingly more effective in Canada.
- 2) The same factors have caused the federal government to cede and lose much of its jurisdiction to regulate standards and to control the economy. Further, its commitment to a reduced role is apparent as it floats ideas such as the devolution of legal and political responsibility for social welfare, education and health to the provinces. There, business will exercise more power, aided by the Internal Trade Agreement.
- 3) Functionally, if not legally, the provinces' powers have been diminished by the FTA, NAFTA (for example, see the Ontario NDP's cave-in on the public automobile question) and now by the Internal Trade Agreement. Retaining such constitutional powers as they have, or even increasing them, is really beside the point:

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effective provincial sovereignty is on the wane.


- 4) Quebec's drive for sovereignty would stand in sharp contrast to all of this were it not that that drive is being led by a Parti québécois government which has declared its solemn intent to buy into the anti-sovereigntist FTA, NAFTA, and GATT developments. It is likely to want to use the Internal Trade Agreement as a framework for trade with the Rest of Canada.
- 5) A peculiar debate is now under way. It is one in which lawyers and politicians are consumed by the passions of democracy, nationalism, ethnicity, culture, concerns for first nations' aspirations, sovereignty, and so on, while failing to recognize that fundamental changes already have taken place and are going to continue apace. These changes make much of the public debate, if not surreal, at least superstructural. Capital's increased political sovereignty might well have been attained without the help of constitutional politics in Canada and Quebec, but it certainly has been helped in its cause by

being able to piggy-back on the constitutional push towards political balkanization and economic integration, lately reflected in the Charlottetown accord.

- 6) The dominant corporations are very happy with the happenings thus far. They do not want the election of the Parti québécois and the politics of nationalism to spoil the party. This explains some of the Rest of Canada's response to recent Quebec developments. More so than in previous constitutional negotiations, the Rest of Canada's approach is overtly economic. Threats are issued: Québécois will not be allowed, by capital, to play in the only game in town—free trade, unrestricted financial institutions—if they demand too much. Paradoxically, the instability that will result for capital if the Parti québécois wins the referendum and hot-headed politicians elsewhere refuse to let Quebec remain part of the newly entrenched economic unit, is the Parti québécois' strongest card. This is why these ugly threats backed by abstract legal arguments, while useful for a moment, need to be kept in

check. This is why when corporate agenda proponents, like the C.D. Howe Institute, put out menacing messages, there is a distancing by the powers that be from them; note how Jean Chrétien, Daniel Johnson, and even Ralph Klein have said that they do not want to adopt the C.D. Howe line at this stage.

Capital stands to win either if the Parti québécois loses its bid or if it wins the referendum, provided that, in the latter case, the government of Quebec immediately subjugates its democratically attained sovereignty to the corporate agenda. The real (and only) danger to capital's political and economic sovereignty is that the politicians may not be astute enough to see that, when all is said and done, it is better for capital to accept a Quebec sovereignty decision than it is to reject it out of political pique. The rest of us in English Canada and in Quebec stand to win if, somehow, the politics of the constitution can be translated into the politics of the rejection of the corporate agenda. The prospects are not good.

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LIVING WITH A LOWER DOLLAR

by Tom Kent

In 1995 we will become accustomed to an exchange rate for the Canadian dollar of around US\$0.70, perhaps less. Will we take advantage of it, as we can, to reorient economic and industrial policies, to enhance our production and increase employment? Or will the traders in money, widely supported by pundits and politicians, persuade us that

a "weak" dollar is a disaster that necessitates more restriction of the economy through higher interest rates and further cutting of public expenditure?

We owe the sharpness of the issue to the way in which the Bank of Canada stopped inflation. It avoided the dreaded monetisation of debt by, in large part, externalizing it.

Canada's net debt to foreigners—after allowing for Canadian-owned assets outside the country—is now close to \$350 billion, compared with \$100 billion in 1980. It has escalated particularly rapidly in the 1990s, as we have made our interest payments by borrowing even more.

This is represented, by those who profit from it, as investment in

Canada, dependent on the "market confidence" that must at all costs be sustained. The reality of globalized finances is that trillions of dollars surge around at the touch of computer keys, seeking the highest return of the moment. Some is parked in Canadian bonds and bills because they pay attractively high interest rates to offset the element of risk. It is not money that goes as easily as it comes, but clinging on to it is hailed as the imperative government must respect.

We are too deeply into this folly to find an easy way out. Gradualism has, quietly, been tried. The Bank of Canada has lately been less aggressive in its use of high interest rates to manipulate the exchange rate which has, therefore, gradually slid from around 90 cents to 70 cents over the last three years. The difficulty is that this invites speculation on a continuing slide. Of late, more of our borrowing from foreigners has been offset by Canadians thinking it wise to buy foreign securities. To produce the same net borrowing, therefore, requires a higher premium on interest rates. Manipulation gets more expensive.

Speculators succeed, however, by correctly anticipating a movement in the exchange rate—and then stopping in time. There is no profit in continuing to shift out of a currency once its exchange rate has fallen as far as it is likely to do.

For that reason, a sharp break would be the least painful way out of our dependency on borrowing. The Bank of Canada would stop setting interest rates to attract foreign funds. The exchange rate would become the market rate at which Canadian spending on foreign goods and services (including interest) approximately equals our earnings from the rest of the world.

If the break were made soon—before our interest obligations grow

even larger—that exchange rate could prove to be close to the present 70 cents. Initially, however, it might plunge well below the market rate. If so, it would come back up. The interim would be unpleasant, but not an occasion for panic.

There is not space here to discuss all of the adjustments to economic policies that would complement an unmanipulated exchange rate, however and whenever it comes. I shall concentrate on an illustration of how industrial policy could cope with volatile financial markets. The proposal is equally applicable whether government makes the sharp break or, as is more likely, it soldiers on with Bank of Canada policy as it is.

Government rightly emphasizes that for more production and employment, we must look chiefly to small- and medium-sized enterprises. But they are enterprises that are inhibited by the volatility of currencies. Multi-nationals and other large exporters can arrange some hedges for themselves. Small Canadian enterprises cannot, and forward exchange transactions are of little help, particularly to companies competing with imports in the domestic market.

A 70-cent dollar offers many opportunities to export or to compete with imports that were unprofitable at 90 cents. Industries with spare capacity respond promptly, but investments in new plants and equipment are not made in response to fleeting opportunities. Their profitability depends on the average exchange rate over a payback period of several years. What that will be is, in the perception of most small businesses, a complete unknown.


The prospects for world economic growth would be much improved if we could return internationally to the kind of exchange stability provided by the IMF regime of the '50s and '60s. Since that is not at present

possible, Canada must find for itself what will help a small, open economy to live with the present kind of globalized finance.

The need is a measure of insurance for enterprises that invest in new production on a reasonable assumption about the relevant exchange rate, but subsequently experience a significantly higher rate and consequently disappointing sales.

Such insurance should be the business of banks. The policies could be flexibly written to fit particular circumstances, as to the currency involved, the relevant markets, the time period, the volume of sales, and extent of exchange variation covered. Given the ability of banks to spread their risks, it should be possible to provide a good measure of insurance protection without burdensome premium rates. Also given, however, the institutional caution of banks' services to smaller, innovative enterprises, it may be that the program could be launched successfully with reasonable premium rates only if government initially provided guarantees—for the insurance of small enterprises, not the corporations that should be able to look after themselves.

This would be a very modest program compared with all that government has done to promote industry—much of it, in the absence of a coherent policy, done ineffectively. It would be a program precisely targeted to a clear need. It would not work miracles, but it is one way in which we might make the adjustment to global change that inspires so much rhetoric and so little action.

Tom Kent has been a public servant, corporate executive, editor, and academic. In retirement, he is associated with the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. 

MARCH 1995 IN *CANADA WATCH*

The next issue will be a special report on Referendum 1995, with an expanded number of commentators from Quebec and Canada. It will include articles on the economic, social, and political state of play between Ottawa and Quebec. As well, there will be an in-depth look at public opinion and strategy, the role of the media, the aboriginal agenda, and the Martin budget in the pre-Referendum strategy of Ottawa and Quebec.

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