



CANADA WATCH

Practical Analysis of Constitutional and Other Key National Issues

ODDS FAVOUR MULRONEY DEPARTURE

Game of Cat and Mouse Keeps Official Ottawa Guessing

by Patrick J. Monahan

With a federal election now mere months away (the election must be called by December 5 of this year), the main topic of conversation on Parliament Hill is the growing speculation over the future of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

By mid-January, the prime minister had given no public hint of his intentions. But his mini-Cabinet shuffle, highlighted by the move of Justice Minister Kim Campbell to Defence, was deliciously ambiguous, serving only to heighten the guessing game that appears to have stalled the government and consumed official Ottawa.

TWO VIEWS OF THE SHUFFLE

One interpretation of the mini-shuffle argues that it confirms Mulroney's intention to stay on and fight the next election. On this "stay and fight" interpretation, the move of Campbell to Defence was a demotion. Defence may have a whopping \$12 billion budget, but the politics of the portfolio are all wrong — closing military bases or signing contracts for military helicopters does not make for good "optics" for an aspiring prime minister. By demoting the minister widely touted as his probable successor, Mulroney demonstrated that he is still calling the shots and is prepared to lead the party forward into the next electoral campaign.

Another view suggests precisely the opposite interpretation of the significance of the mini-shuffle. This "cut and run" interpretation sees in the mini-shuffle firm evidence of the fact that the PM has already made up his mind to go gracefully. On this view, the most important feature of the mini-shuffle was its cosmetic character. The prime minister thus signalled that he was leaving to his successor the hard choices that have to be made about the Tory lineup for the next election.

The apparent plausibility of both the "stay and fight" and the "cut and run" interpretations ensured that the mini-shuffle would only add to the speculation frenzy that has gripped the capital — suggesting that the PM must be getting immense enjoyment out of the rampant speculation over his intentions. It also may signal that Mulroney has not yet made up his mind whether to resign or to fight a third national election.

HOW THE DECISION WILL BE MADE

But there are two fundamental realities that together will shape that decision — and that suggest that the Conservative party will be led by someone other than Brian Mulroney on the day the writ is dropped for the 1993 campaign.

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The first fundamental reality is Mulroney's continuing low standing in the public opinion polls. The Tory party has been languishing below 20 percent in decided-voter support for over two years. But Mulroney's personal popularity has been even lower, with most polls showing that less than 10 percent of Canadians believe him to be the best candidate for prime minister. Keith Spicer's observation in the summer of 1991 that "there is a fury in the land against the prime minister" seems no less true today than it was 18 months ago.

The second fundamental reality is time. The sands of the electoral clock have just about run down for Brian Mulroney. Relying on Mulroney's own method of "picking the election day and working backwards" (as described in his infamous "roll of the dice" interview in June 1990), a new Tory leader would have to be in place by July 1 at the very latest in order to prepare for a fall campaign. The planning and preparation for a national leadership convention would require a minimum of three months. This suggests that the PM could conceivably wait until sometime in March before announcing definitively his intentions.

But in practical terms, Mulroney can't afford to wait until March. The government appears paralyzed while waiting for the PM to clear the air in a definitive fashion. The national media will write and talk about little else once Parliament resumes sitting on February 1. Effectively, this means the PM has until mid-February to make a final decision.

ANSWERING THE QUESTION

Will Mulroney stay or will he go? The answer to that question depends almost entirely on the way in which the PM answers the prior question — can he win? If the prime minister concludes that he has a reasonable

chance of besting his opponents in an election campaign, he will almost certainly stay on and try to win a third term. But if he determines that he has no reasonable prospects of victory, the only practical option is to go gracefully now rather than be thrown out of office by the voters within a few months.

Notice that the critical factor is Mulroney's own subjective belief about his electoral prospects, as opposed to an objective, independent assessment of those prospects by a disinterested observer. Yet, even discounting the fact that prime ministerial advisers typically paint the rosiest picture possible of their boss' political shelf life, combined with the ten-

"The history of world affairs is littered with examples of political, military, and business leaders who were simply unable to come to terms with the fact that their imminent defeat was inevitable."

dency of most politicians to overestimate their own persuasive abilities on the hustings, there seems little escape from the conclusion that defeat is inevitable in any electoral campaign featuring Brian Mulroney in 1993.

Those urging the PM to stay will argue that the public opinion polls are misleading because they do not tell us how voters will actually behave when they are asked to mark a ballot on election day. According to this line of argument (one that the PM has appeared to endorse on occasion), voters will make their final decisions based on a comparison of Mulroney with the available alternatives. Since the public has shown remarkably little enthusiasm for either Jean Chrétien or Audrey McLaughlin, Mulroney still has a chance to make up sufficient ground so as to form a minority government.

The problem with this scenario is that it underestimates the very deep

voter antipathy toward Brian Mulroney, particularly outside Quebec. It also overestimates the degree to which voters cast their ballots based on a careful assessment of the policies and performance of the opposition party leaders. In the recent Ontario election, for example, the electorate was primarily voting *against* the government of David Peterson, rather than *for* the policies and the leadership of the NDP. (Those NDP policies, embodied in a document entitled "Agenda for People," were known to only a handful of voters, as Dan Rath and Georgette Gagnon demonstrated in their book *Not Without Cause*.)

This same process would undoubtedly manifest itself in any 1993 campaign featuring Brian Mulroney. The relative lack of enthusiasm for Jean Chrétien and Audrey McLaughlin will be an interesting but irrelevant footnote to a campaign that will provide the electorate with a long-awaited opportunity to administer a political defeat to the most unpopular prime minister in Canadian history.

Of course, the virtually self-evident character of this conclusion is no guarantee that the PM will necessarily come to it of his own accord. The history of world affairs is littered with examples of political, military, and business leaders who were simply unable to come to terms with the fact that their imminent defeat was inevitable. Whether Brian Mulroney is destined to join their ranks, or whether he will rightly conclude that his run in the Prime Minister's Office is about to end, will be known in the space of the next few weeks.

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NEW LANGUAGE DEBATE IN THE OFFING

by Kenneth McRoberts

In the wake of the Meech Lake debacle, Canada seemed to be headed for profound change. In a great many areas the established ways of doing things clearly were no longer working — and had to be replaced. But if there was any one domain where fundamental change seemed most likely, it was language policy.

Whether on radio talk shows, at “town hall” meetings, or in scientific soundings of public opinion, official bilingualism regularly emerged as a central focus of public discontent. Thus, the report of the Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future called for a thorough examination of Canada’s language policy, even though the primary author of the report, Keith Spicer, had been Canada’s first official languages commissioner.

AVOIDING THE DEBATE

Yet, as it turned out, this was a debate that was not to be. Canada’s three main political parties, and national leadership in general, carefully steered clear of language policy, apparently in the belief that it was simply too explosive a topic to be the focus of a rational discussion. Alberta premier Don Getty did try to launch a debate calling for an end to any legislated status for language, but his intervention was generally dismissed as a transparent attempt to stave off the inroads of the Reform party — as, indeed, it probably was.

Now that the constitutional question, and any attempt to deal with Canada’s unity problems, has been resolutely placed on the back burner, the chances of public debate over language policy seems to be remote. Yet, it appears that, like it or not, Canadians may have such a debate after all.

As Guy Laforest notes in this issue of *Canada Watch*, Quebec government leaders may be unable to prevent a new public debate over Quebec’s notorious sign law. Bill 178’s protection under the notwithstanding clause expires in December of this year. A formal legislative vote is necessary for this protection to be extended.

Any attempt to weaken Bill 178, let alone eliminate it, is bound to produce strong opposition among large numbers of Quebec francophones. Yet, retention of the Bill, even in an attenuated form, will not go unnoticed in the rest of Canada. In all likelihood it will pro-

“Now that the constitutional question, and any attempt to deal with Canada’s unity problems, has been resolutely placed on the back burner, the chances of public debate over language policy seems to be remote. Yet, it appears that, like it or not, Canadians may have such a debate after all.”

voke the same deep hostility that was triggered by the introduction of the Bill five years ago. This hostility, it should be noted, went beyond the specific provisions of the Bill. Many English Canadians voiced objections to Bill 101 itself, and the very notion of legislating French pre-eminence.

ENGLISH CANADIAN OPPOSITION TO QUEBEC’S LANGUAGE LAW

For many, Bill 178 seemed in direct contradiction to an agenda that Quebecois had themselves imposed on the rest of the country: equal status for English and French

“from coast to coast.” In effect, Quebec seemed to be acting in bad faith. Quebec francophones might protest that this agenda had been Ottawa’s (or, more precisely, Trudeau’s) rather than theirs. Or they might claim that, as a language under threat, French needs protection everywhere, Quebec included, and that any equation between the situation of Quebec’s anglophone minority and that of the francophone minorities in the other provinces is fundamentally mistaken. But these subtleties were lost on most English Canadians.

In short, the upcoming debate over Bill 178 and its fate will in all likelihood not be restricted to Quebec, however much government leaders in Quebec and the rest of the country might wish that it were. And it might well extend to the underlying principles of language policy.

NEW FEDERAL VOICES

In addition, within English Canada itself there exists the basis for a major debate over language policy during the coming year. The Reform party has regularly reiterated its opposition to federal language policy. The coming federal election may well see a surge in Reform representation in the House. After all, within English Canada, Reform was the only clear winner of the referendum debacle.

For that matter, a surge in Reform representation may also be matched by a surge in Bloc québécois support. Despite appearances, the two parties may well find common ground on the language question. After all, both parties represent populations that firmly believe that someone else’s language is being “shoved down their throat.” They would probably disagree about

the status of English and French at the federal level. But the Bloc québécois would have no difficulty endorsing Reform's position that language and culture should be an exclusively provincial responsibility and that only the Quebec government, not Ottawa, should be concerned with protecting and promoting the French language.

With this new leadership at the federal level, some English Canadians might be led to look at Bill 101, if not Bill 178, in a new light. Legislating French pre-eminence in Quebec would remain unattractive but it could be made palatable if it were traded off against the principle that English should remain pre-eminent in the rest of the country.

THE TRUDEAU STRATEGY AND ITS FATE

This would constitute a radically different vision not only of the status of languages but of the country itself and how its problems should be addressed. Under the Trudeau strategy, national unity meant bringing Canadians together. The goal was to strengthen the French fact throughout the country. This meant not only teaching French to English Canadians, but reinforcing the presence throughout Canada of people whose first language is French. Bilingualism, and contact between language groups, was to be the pre-eminent national experience; Canadians were to be personally enriched by it and Canada was to achieve greatness through it, appearing as a model to the world of linguistic harmony and justice.

In the wake of the Charlottetown fiasco, Canadians may have more modest ambitions for the country. Thoroughly alienated by the interminable constitutional debate, they may well be ready to settle for a peaceable coexistence. From this perspective, the focus of language policy becomes one of reducing ir-

ritations. This means defining language policy more fully in terms of provincial majorities rather than minorities.

In point of fact, on a demographic basis, Quebec and the rest of the country are increasingly dominated by their linguistic majorities. To this extent, the Trudeau strategy failed. For instance, the 1991 census reveals that assimilationist pressures on francophones outside Quebec continue to take their toll. Outside Quebec the proportion of Canadians with French as their mother tongue who continue to use French as their home language has now dropped to 35.1 percent.

To be sure, personal bilingualism continues to grow among English Canadians — a clear legacy of the Trudeau vision of Canada. Outside Quebec, among Canadians of English mother tongue between the ages of 5 and 19, the proportion able to speak French has risen from 3 percent in 1971 to 11 percent in 1991. In effect, outside Quebec, English Canadians are becoming more conversant in French while French Canadians there are using it less.

The growth in English-Canadian bilingualism is, of course, largely the result of the remarkable expansion of immersion programs in public schools. However, recent enrollment figures suggest that this phenomenon may have reached its peak. Immersion schools have come under renewed questioning, thanks not only to heightened fiscal constraints and even some doubts about their linguistic attainment but a recognition that in terms of promoting national unity, French immersion simply has not worked; it has not brought Canadians together. But then, how could it have done so? Most English Canadians, however bilingual they may be, will have little regular contact with French Canadians, given the exceedingly

small presence of francophones in most regions outside Quebec. And how does the heightened bilingualism of English Canadians affect the day-to-day lives of the overwhelming majority of francophones, concentrated in Quebec?

In sum, Canada's postponed debate over language policy may yet take place. If it does, a consensus may emerge around a new approach in which formal equality between English and French is restricted to federal institutions, and primarily in Ottawa. At the provincial level, a single language will have official status, with the exception of New Brunswick, where demography favours formal equality. Minority language services will be provided in distinct minority-language institutions rather than within common structures, with a firm emphasis on a policy of "where numbers warrant."

Although less generous or noble than the Trudeau vision of a Canada in which both provincial and federal governments are committed to official bilingualism and the maximum expansion of minority language rights, such a "territorial" approach would probably be more generally acceptable to Canadians, and on that basis more likely to promote Canada's elusive "national unity."

Kenneth McRoberts is Director of the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies and Professor of Political Science at York University.



THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD IN WASHINGTON

by Stephen Clarkson

Unlike the ideological oscillations of post-war British politics, the left-right cycles in Canada have not been synchronized with those of the United States. In 1968, when Richard Nixon ushered in a quarter century of American conservatism, Pierre Trudeau invigorated Canadian liberalism with his charismatic pitch for a renewed commitment to an activist, bilingual federalism. In 1984, Brian Mulroney came to power having indicated his opposition to the panacea of free trade and his support for the welfare state. It was only in 1985, when the Reaganauts were already moving into their less crazed, less xenophobic phase, that Mulroney, wallowing aimlessly on the political sea, grasped the neo-conservative chart handed to him by the Macdonald commission and swung the ship of state to starboard.

Although this historical syncope suggests that the Democrats' recent feat of capturing the White House while holding on to their majorities in Congress and the Senate will have little immediate impact on Canadian politics, common sense suggests otherwise. Most signs indicate, on the contrary, that the end of the neo-conservative phase in American history will also terminate Canada's unhappy experiment with an ideology so foreign to its culture.

I do not want to overstate the case. Bill Clinton's dramatic victory does not represent a radical rejection of conservatism. As a right-wing Democrat, he subscribes to much of the conservative critique of the welfare system even if he does want to expand health care to cover the 50 million Americans in the underclass. He inherits such a large budgetary deficit and national debt

"A Tory conservatism revived by Kim Campbell would be politically all the more saleable given the Liberals' rejection in 1990 of Paul Martin who not only talked the language of Clinton's lead economic adviser, Robert Reich, but understood it."

from Reagan's time that any inclinations toward social-democratic munificence will be strictly curtailed by the greater priority of keeping the markets calm and the dollar steady.

SEARCHING FOR A CANADIAN CLINTON?

Nevertheless, Clinton's attractive political persona and interventionist economic message are likely to have a direct impact on Canadian parties.

This smarter, more savvy, and less libidinous version of John Kennedy gives Canadian Tories one more powerful reason to urge their leader to retire before he brings electoral disaster down around their heads. With the Clinton model very much in mind, they would be able to replace Mulroney with their own smart, savvy newcomer from the periphery who has the capacity to shift her party back to a more government-friendly stance. A Tory conservatism revived by Kim Campbell would be politically all the more salable given the Liberals' rejection in 1990 of Paul Martin, who not only talked the language of Clinton's lead economic adviser, Robert Reich, but understood it.

Bill Clinton may make Jean Chrétien seem even more out of step with his times than he naturally seems, but the U.S. president makes Bob Rae and Mike Harcourt appear positively sensible in their attempts to invent industrial strategies that are compatible with the shackles imposed by NAFTA. It is dangerous to write off a government that has two more years to rule; the spillover effect of Clinton's economic platform should make the NDP's shaky grip on office considerably more secure, particularly if the U.S. eco-

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conomic recovery pulls Canadians out of their economic despair.

CANADIAN-U.S. RELATIONS UNDER CLINTON

As for the Canadian-American relationship, speculation has to draw on such symbolic acts as the gestures of each head of government. When Prime Minister Mulroney goes out of his way to pay court to President Bush, visiting him at Camp David to make a pointed fond farewell, he is underlining his lack of either contact or rapport with the incoming administration. When President-Elect Clinton gives his first audience with a foreign head of government to President Salinas and manages to hold an open-air press conference about NAFTA with his Mexican counterpart without giving the impression that Canada exists, he is telling us something about the new administration's interest in its other neighbour.

Do these indications of non-communication between the new president and the old prime minister matter? Intimate, not to say fawning, relations between Brian and Ronnie, then Brian and George, did not prevent a severe worsening of trade relations between the two countries (as measured in U.S. countervailing actions against Canadian exports).

Happy CanAm summitry produced a trade agreement so damaging to the fabric of the Canadian polity that the country's survival as a nation state is now an open question. Unfortunately, it does not follow that cooler feelings between the White House and 24 Sussex Drive will improve Canada's only crucial for-

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ign relationship. More than Bill Clinton's pleasantries, it is better economic conditions in the United States that are needed to reduce the proclivity of beleaguered American businesses to harass their Canadian competitors.

Where Clinton could make a difference is in moderating the American response should a Liberal/NDP government decide to abrogate the free trade deals. Although the two

agreements he inherits give his government unprecedented powers to intervene in Canadian (and now Mexican) affairs, the former Arkansas governor has no personal capital involved in their negotiation, so he would be less vindictive in considering retaliation than would a re-elected Bush. Like Carter before him, Clinton's internationalism promises less gratuitous military adventurism in U.S. global policies and hemispheric initiatives. As a result, Canada should find itself, as in the 1970s, with more room should a new prime minister wish to pursue directions different from those of the State Department, and if the Uruguay Round of the GATT is brought to a successful conclusion, the Canadian business class may be able to raise its horizons from its continental fixation and test its capacities beyond the confines of Fortress America.

In sum, the end of the Reagan/Bush era and the arrival of Bill Clinton may offer Canada a new margin of manoeuvrability, giving it a chance to turn the clock back and return part of the way to the situation before Mulroney headed it toward the rocks.

Stephen Clarkson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto.



WHAT DID THE JUDGES KNOW, AND HOW DO THEY KNOW IT?

by *Thelma McCormack*

Less than a decade ago, any textbook in criminology would have described pornography as a "victimless crime." Sociologists and social psychologists were studying the pathology of censors and various right-wing social movements, while the Law Reform Commission of 1975, chaired by the Honourable E. Patrick Hartt, recommended that

obscenity be removed from the *Criminal Code*. The late chief justice of the Supreme Court, Bora Laskin, wrote: "We espouse this freedom [of expression] because of a conviction supported by experience, that individual creativity, whether in the arts or in the humanities or in science or in technology, constitutes our social capital."

Yet, in 1992, when the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to remove obscenity from the *Criminal Code*, or at least pave the way to more enlightened regulation, it chose not to. In the *Butler* case, the court reviewed a Manitoba Court of Appeal decision that had found that a group of videos were protected by section 2(b) of the Charter even

though they were considered obscene under section 163(8) of the *Criminal Code*. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reversed the Manitoba Court of Appeal and held that section 163(8) of the *Criminal Code* is valid under the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

In effect, the court slammed the door, at least for the time being, on the removal of obscenity from the *Criminal Code*. It strengthened the *Criminal Code*, weakened the Charter, and made it clear that (rental) videos, the most recently developed consumer communication technology, would no longer be left unregulated, the wild card in the deck.

Following the *Butler* decision, the enforcement agencies — Customs and Project P in Toronto — wasted no time in harassing the gay and lesbian communities, and ironically *Sex*, Madonna's coffee table book of S/M fantasies, hit the trade just in time for Christmas. The *Butler* decision, however, did more than just ruin our holidays and censure us for having libidinal fantasies. It took judicial thinking back a century to a time when the social sciences played no role in judicial thinking and moral considerations were paramount. "The grinch who stole Christmas" took the critical legal theory movement with it as well.

THE COURT'S APPROACH

The court held that pornography was a moral problem, as distinct from a question of taste, but that morality must be grounded in social practices. The "degrading and dehumanizing" images of women found in pornography, it said, are conducive to anti-social attitudes toward women and acts of sexual assault. It was not necessary, the court said, to prove this cause-and-effect relationship — the possibility that pornography is an effect, not a cause, was not considered even for a

moment. It was enough for Parliament to have a "reasonable basis for concluding that harm will result and this requirement does not demand actual proof of harm." If there is no empirical evidence, the court is saying in effect, there ought to be.

But can we trust legislators who are under various kinds of social pressures and are more likely to defend freedom of expression in political matters than in cultural ones? The concept of "community standards" was intended to take the bur-

"The MacKinnon/Dworkin view is based on a deeply reactionary Skinnerian concept of human nature — a model that removes values, judgment, critical reflection, and, indeed, thought itself. Through operant conditioning — in this case, extensive exposure to pornography and light sentences for sexual offenders — we can become anything and do anything."

den off them and strengthen a commitment to the Laskin doctrine of creativity as social capital. True civil libertarians, however, have never liked the community standards test. Civil liberties, they argue, protect dissident minorities from "the tyranny of the majority." Critical theorists have not liked it either, because it represents a market concept; feminists have suspected it of being gender-biased; cultural elitists regard it as an acquiescence to popular low- and middle-brow culture; and fundamentalists see it as the means of legitimating an amoral permissive society. Recently, in a case involving rap music, the defence argued that vulgar and scatological lyrics are the authentic voice of the inner-city black ghetto. In short, no one really likes the community stand-

ards test except the consumers of easy-listening music, B movies, and other non-improving entertainment.

The court accepted the test of community standards, but operationalized it to mean the least tolerance: not what you or I might accept, but what we think others in our community would and should tolerate. The court gutted what was good about the community standards test — its democratization — kept what was bad — its majoritarianism — and redefined the whole as the "moral majority."

THE ROLE OF LEAF

No one was too surprised by the conservative thinking of the court. More controversial and surprising to many was the submission by LEAF (Legal Education and Action Fund), the feminist organization of women lawyers. Written by Kathleen Mahoney and influenced by the work of Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, the LEAF factum took the following positions:

1. Pornography is not a work of imagination, an expression, but an overt act of discrimination and harm. [Life doesn't imitate art, or art imitate life; they are one and the same.]
2. Pornography harms women by undermining their physical safety and reinforcing subordination or inequality.
3. Censorship, far from being a necessary evil or the lesser of two evils, contributes to progress. "Prohibiting pornography," it said, "promotes equality."

On the first point, the MacKinnon/Dworkin notion that there is no distinction between thought and action, fantasy and fact, dream and deed, is the view held by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* is not, he said, a work of art, but an act of blasphemy. More generally, the distinction between thought and deed is the cornerstone of both liberal democracy and a humanistic model of human nature. The MacKinnon/

Dworkin view is based on a deeply reactionary Skinnerian concept of human nature — a model that removes values, judgment, critical reflection, and, indeed, thought itself. Through operant conditioning — in this case, extensive exposure to pornography and light sentences for sexual offenders — we can become anything and do anything. There are no inhibitions, no self-imposed restraints. Nothing, except fear of external social controls, could deter us from engaging in any anti-social act if we thought we could get away with it. In the end what we have is a police state with a liberal gloss.

On the second point, that pornography is a harm, there is no credible evidence from studies of either pornography or sex offenders, but the case for equality is a different matter. Both LEAF and the court were concerned about gender equality, which they regarded as endangered by pornography. They cited no evidence and, indeed, there is nothing in the vast social science literature — economics, political science, anthropology, sociology — to support

any connection between pornography and the various forms of inequality: race, gender, or class. A cursory review of recent cases on equality indicates that it is the ideal-

"Equality in the feminist context is a transformative concept that challenges the patriarchal social order. It cannot be separated from freedom of expression any more than mind can be separated from body. Sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter are one and the same."

ized woman, the stereotyped mainstream, family-centred woman, who is used by employers to justify pay inequity, hiring discrimination, lack of daycare, limited mobility, etc., not the lust-driven nymphomaniac of pornography.

LEAF failed to make a distinction between *degradation* and *devaluation*, and it is devaluation that supports the 66 cent dollar, job segregation, and underemployment. A greater fallacy is to define equality

in narrow terms. Equality in the feminist context is a transformative concept that challenges the patriarchal social order. It cannot be separated from freedom of expression any more than mind can be separated from body. Sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter are one and the same. The tradeoff theory, implicit in liberal theory and explicit in the court's decision as well as the LEAF factum, creates a split not only between equality and liberation, but between the women's movement as an interest group and feminism as an insurgent social movement.

Censorship, as advocated by LEAF and upheld by the court, overprotects women, deprives us of our own repatriation, and puts a human face on gender inequality. That is what the Supreme Court, seeking to extend its control over new communication technology and reflecting a neo-conservative political atmosphere, has learned and how it learned it.

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WOMEN'S FEAR OF MALE VIOLENCE

by Michael D. Smith, Tracey Smith, Rachel Osborne, and Valorie Hemminger

How pervasive is women's fear of men's sexual and physical violence in public places? What strategies do women employ to make themselves feel safer? What is the relationship between sexual harassment in public and fear?

We address these questions using data from a recently completed survey of women in Canada. The survey was conducted in English and French by means of computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) with a national probability sample of 1,990 working women. Female interviewers employed by

the Institute for Social Research, located at York University, conducted the interviews in spring and summer 1992.

In an effort to encourage respondents to answer sensitive questions honestly and fully, we employed a woman-centred approach to interviewing. This included using broad definitions of sexual harassment based on women's subjective experiences; following up reports of victimization with detailed questions about social context, consequences, and the like; making extensive use of open-ended questions to allow respondents to re-

late their experiences in their own words; and identifying and selecting the best interviewers available and training them with particular care. Our goal was to elicit data that did some justice to the delicacy and complexity of the subject matter while adhering to the fundamental principles of mainstream survey research, such as those that regard getting a representative sample.

THE Pervasiveness of Fear

The first part of the survey focused on women's fear of sexual and physical violence in public places. Respond-

ents were asked initially how afraid they felt for their personal safety alone after dark in four public settings. The proportions of women who said they were at least somewhat afraid in each of these settings are as follows: 33 percent felt either "somewhat" or "very afraid" walking alone

"... 9 out of every 10 women interviewed reported having been subjected at least once as an adult to some form of unwanted sexual attention by a male or males in a public place."

in their own neighbourhood, 40 percent using public transportation, 76 percent walking to a car in an underground parking garage, and 79 percent passing by groups of unknown men or boys.

When asked about other possible fear-provoking situations, about a third of the women surveyed described one or more such situations in their own words. Their descriptions uncovered a corrosive anxiety about sexual and physical safety that permeates almost every aspect of women's lives, not only in the public sphere, but at work and home as well. Some typical responses:

In Public

When there is a carload of young men following me, like a carload of young men who are drinking. I get off the road if I hear them drive by.

Waiting for the bus at midnight. I feel very afraid at the stop at ...

In shopping malls or parking lots. I don't feel safe at all.

At Work

I'm a janitor in a high school. Sometimes I'm really scared with those kids, especially at night.

When I come out of work at night I sometimes have to lock

up the store by myself and sometimes that is scary.

Doing open houses. I'm a real estate agent.

At Home

You may think I'm paranoid, but I'm even afraid of sitting on my porch after dark. I'm even afraid to sunbathe there after there was a rape across the street. It's just not safe.

I'm afraid at home if my door is unlocked.

I'm scared after I get out of my car and walk to my house.

Parks, movie theatres, elevators, stairwells, museums, post offices, libraries, restaurants, bars, automobiles, streets, taxis, subways, buses, subway stops, bus stops, banking machines, work, school, and, although it is not a public place, home — virtually every imaginable public, semi-public, and private setting was named by at least some women as a site of fear.

COPING WITH FEAR

Canadian women go to considerable lengths to reduce their fear and to protect themselves from dangerous men. The women in this survey were asked how often they employed three specific measures to make themselves "feel safer" when they were out in public. Their responses: 73 percent stayed away from certain streets, 25 percent carried something to defend themselves with, and 7 percent carried something to alert other people with either always, most of the time, or some of the time.

Asked if they take other steps to protect their safety in public places, a majority of all women (63 percent) said "yes" and then described the steps they take. A preliminary analysis of this material resulted in six overlapping categories of coping strategies. We labelled these: (1) precautions, (2) avoidance, (3) self-defence,

(4) fitness, (5) appearance, and (6) demeanour. Most responses spanned more than one category, as these examples suggest:

Precautions, Avoidance

Going into my car, I try to look in first. In the elevator, early in the morning, if I see someone suspicious, I don't go in, I wait.

Self-Defence, Fitness

I carry my keys in my hand and I put one key between each finger. I try to stay fit so I can run if I have to.

Appearance, Demeanour, Avoidance

I try to make myself look unattractive, mostly with my hair and facial expression. I don't make eye contact. I have a self-contained attitude when I'm coming home really late. I don't feel comfortable or at ease unless I put on a tough exterior.

HARASSMENT AND FEAR

Government-sponsored crime victimization surveys have found consistently that women are much more afraid of being a victim of violent crime than men, but much less likely to suffer a violent victimization. According to these studies, most of which define violence in narrow, legalistic terms, women's

"... it is not necessarily what happens during such episodes that produces these feelings; it is the not knowing and the lack of control over how such episodes will end, the nagging, gnawing sense that something horrible could happen."

fear of violence is greatly out of proportion to their risk of actually being victimized, which is low. This has led to the suggestion in some quarters that women's fear is subjective — that is, not based on actual

experiences with violence. Yet surveys by feminist researchers that define violence on the basis of what women themselves consider violence, including terrifying experiences with non-criminal street harassment, obscene phone calls, and the like, have uncovered very high levels of victimization.

Consider just one finding from the study at hand: 9 out of every 10 women interviewed reported having been subjected at least once as an adult to some form of unwanted sexual attention by a male or males in a public place. Almost all of these women provided an in-depth account of their worst experience of this sort.

"Some feminists propose that the threat and reality of male sexual and physical violence are important factors in the social control of women, keeping women in a state of anxiety and leading them to narrow the scope of their lives in an effort to protect themselves from danger. The data presented here provide compelling evidence that this is so."

Although the majority of the women were not physically injured or sexually assaulted in the strict legal sense of the term, most were shaken emotionally. As they made clear, it is not necessarily *what* happens during such episodes that produces these feelings; it is the not knowing and the lack of control over how such episodes will end, the nagging, gnawing sense that something horrible *could* happen.

The account that follows (from over 1,800 similar stories) conveys something of this sense. It also underlines the point that concern about sexual and physical well-being is part and parcel of most women's normal daily routines. Consider just

one such routine, travelling home from work:

I was waiting in the subway, coming home from work. A man came up beside me and started saying he would like to perform various sexual acts with me. Then I went over to a group of men, hoping they might sort of protect me. Then the subway came and I got on further down the platform. But the man ran and got on the same car. He stared at me and said to the other people, "She thinks I'm following her" and other things. Then he came very close and stared at me and made me feel very uncomfortable. I got off the subway when it was my stop and that was that. He didn't follow me off ... I was terrified. I had just moved here and I had to come home late at night. I was surprised because the man looked nice at first. You wouldn't think he would be the type to do these sorts of things.

Some feminists propose that the threat and reality of male sexual and physical violence are important factors in the social control of women, keeping women in a state of anxiety and leading them to narrow the scope of their lives in an effort to protect themselves from danger. The data presented here provide compelling evidence that this is so. One thing is clear, women's fear will end only when men's harassment and violence does.

The authors teach at the Department of Sociology and the LaMarsh Research Program on Violence and Conflict Resolution, York University.



WESTERN REPORT

WATCHING THE ABORIGINAL HORIZON

by Roger Gibbins

Over the next few months western Canadians, like all Canadians, will avoid any long-term political thinking pending the upcoming federal election. This election will be of particular interest in the region given the uncertain future of the Reform party. It will provide the first full test of fire for Reform, and recent polls suggest that success is far from certain. A lot will depend, of course, on the prime minister's decision about his own future.

It is not, then, a time for bold regional initiatives on the national stage. Nor is there any indication that western premiers would welcome any such initiatives. In the wake of the October referendum, the game plan is to stick close to the home fires.

The lull, however, will not last because the next major challenge is on the horizon. It will come from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, whose research teams are fanning out across the country. Although the commission's report has yet to be written, there is no doubt that it will thrust Aboriginal self-government back to the centre of the national stage. Within the commission, and perhaps only within the commission, constitutional politics are alive and well.

Given the lull on other fronts, it is an opportune time to look ahead to one of the most complex and intriguing public policy questions the region is likely to face.

THE CENTRALITY OF THE WESTERN SCENE

Although the commission's mandate is national, the west will pro-

vide particularly intriguing and difficult terrain for the public policy issues to be addressed.

The centrality of the west to the larger project stems only in part from the relatively large size of the Aboriginal population in the region. A more important factor is the complexity of that population and thus the complexity of the problems to be addressed.

The west contains not only many of the largest and most assertive treaty organizations in the country but also, in British Columbia, the largest non-treaty Aboriginal population. The region contains small rural communities, large urban populations, remote reserves, and reserves contiguous to large urban centres. It contains well-organized treaty and non-treaty Indians along with the great bulk of the Métis population. Aboriginal communities differ tremendously in size, wealth, and human resources.

FASCINATING POLICY CHALLENGES LIE AHEAD

Although it does not take much of an intellectual stretch to apply conventional notions of federalism to Aboriginal communities with a well-defined and reasonably well-resourced land base, it is not at all clear how models of self-government can be used to address the concerns of Aboriginal peoples living in urban environments.

The application of Aboriginal self-government to the region's Métis population will be particularly problematic given that the population still lacks demographic definition, that no landbase exists outside the Métis settlements in Alberta, and that many Métis live in urban centres.

The application of self-government within more conventional, reserve-based Indian communities will have to address very complex ques-

tions relating to the redistribution of wealth both within and across communities. Any right to tax inevitably carries with it questions of redistribution that Aboriginal communities have not yet had to address.

Finally, the application of the *Charter of Rights* within self-governing Aboriginal communities will again emerge as a central issue of public policy and the one most likely to bring the larger Canadian community into play.

A CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT

In reading the entrails of the October 26 referendum, most observers concluded that despite a "no" vote, and a particularly strong "no" vote in the west, a good deal of public support was evident for Abo-

"There is a danger that Canadians may see self-government as a way to shed any continued fiscal responsibility for Aboriginal peoples, and indeed as a means of removing a sense of collective guilt. Aboriginal peoples will be seen as responsible for their own fate, fiscal and otherwise, and Canadians at large may anticipate washing their hands of any ongoing responsibility."

riginal peoples. It should not be assumed, however, that such support, if it in fact exists, will be easily transformed into support for some of the more specific proposals that might emerge from the royal commission.

I would argue that public support for Aboriginal self-government has been systematically overestimated. My concern is that Canadians might not support the concept of Aboriginal self-government that Aboriginal peoples have in mind. There is a danger

that Canadians may see self-government as a way to shed any continued fiscal responsibility for Aboriginal peoples, and indeed as a means of removing a sense of collective guilt. Aboriginal peoples will be seen as responsible for their own fate, fiscal and otherwise, and Canadians at large may anticipate washing their hands of any ongoing responsibility.

It should also be kept in mind that this time around Aboriginal self-government will not be discussed in the context of a broader constitutional package. Yet that package was responsible in part for public support for Aboriginal self-government, because it seemed unconscionable to go ahead with constitutional reform without at the same time addressing the concerns of Aboriginal peoples. However, when the larger package is stripped away, it is not clear that Canadians will bring the same degree of support, concern, and urgency to the concerns of Aboriginal peoples.

Roger Gibbins is Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary. Western Report is a regular feature of Canada Watch.



QUEBEC REPORT

RIGHTS, LANGUAGE AND LIBERALISM

by Guy Laforest

With the start of a new year there are, indeed, many questions in the air in Quebec: what will be the personal and political fates of Robert Bourassa and Brian Mulroney? What would be the consequence of the departure of either or both of them on the dynamics of politics in Quebec and Canada? What kind of future lies ahead for our demands in terms of powers and recognition in the Canadian federation? The recent news concerning the sickness of Robert Bourassa will undeniably nourish such interrogations. Nevertheless, I intend to leave them aside for the moment and to address one problem that is bound to surface in 1993 no matter what happens to our current crop of political leaders.

THE SIGN LAW REVISITED

In December 1988, the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa made the fateful decision to use the famous (infamous in Charterland, as Peter Russell would say) notwithstanding clause of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, in order to adopt Bill 178 and a number of controversial regulations banning outdoor commercial signs in English, thus trumping the Supreme Court ruling that had invalidated specific sections of Bill 101. The move by the Bourassa government had dramatic consequences in the unfolding of the Meech Lake constitutional saga. It immediately provided a justification for the Manitoba government — particularly lukewarm in its attitude toward Meech — to stop the ratification process in its legislature. In retrospect, many analysts

have argued that this was the single most important event in the building up of momentum in the opposition that eventually led to the demise of the accord in June 1990. As we know all too well, we are still affected by the winds that stormed the country at the time.

In Quebec, the promulgation of Bill 178 led to the resignation of three top-notch English-speaking ministers from the Bourassa cabinet: Herbert Marx, Richard French, and Clifford Lincoln. As our society is about to go through a new episode in its linguistic tribulations, since the sun will set in December 1993 for the validity of Bill 178, the words of Clifford Lincoln in the National Assembly at the

"It is an entirely debatable point whether or not commercial signs belong to the core of freedom of expression in a manner such as the Supreme Court of Canada claimed it did. The Bourassa government never tried to wage the linguistic battle at the philosophical level."

time of his resignation remain unforgettable: "Rights are rights are rights." Lincoln, and many others, felt that their fundamental rights and liberties had been violated. Their sense of outrage is still palpable every day in the pages of *The Gazette*, particularly under the pen of William Johnson, who considers Quebec, largely because of this, to be an illiberal society.

I do not know exactly how things will turn out in 1993 on our linguistic battlefield. Claude Ryan, the minister responsible for this file, has asked the members of the Commission de la langue française to make recommendations that could lead to a substantial overhaul of governmental policies on the matter of language. Since this whole domain is at

the heart of anxieties and reflections concerning identity in Quebec, the issue is bound to dominate politics throughout the year. For the time being, there is only one point in this affair that I would like to make.

In the wake of the reverberations following Lincoln's powerful speech in Quebec's English-speaking community, Bourassa made a formal apology. He recognized that he was trampling on fundamental rights, but soon added that he had no choice but to use the notwithstanding clause and pass the legislation. He invoked the need to preserve social peace and the peculiar circumstances of Quebec in North America. He told his fellow English-speaking citizens that he knew he was asking them to sacrifice something crucial. Bourassa's reaction strengthened the intuitions and the furor of a number of leaders of Montreal's English-speaking community. They became more and more convinced that something profoundly illiberal had been accomplished in Quebec. Soon after that, the Equality party was born.

BOURASSA'S MISTAKES

I wish to claim that Bourassa made two tragic mistakes by speaking out as he did: a political error and, more important, a philosophical one. On the political side, he should not have fed the self-righteousness of a number of people in the English-speaking community. The key point, however, is that he should not have taken for granted the narrow vision of liberalism embraced by people such as Julius Grey and William Johnson. It is an entirely debatable point whether or not commercial signs belong to the core of freedom of expression in a manner such as the Supreme Court of Canada claimed it did. The Bourassa government never tried to wage the linguistic battle at the philosophical level. It preferred its usual methods consisting of a mixture of pragmatism, realism, cynicism, and

incrementalism. It preferred the same kinds of methods used at a later stage in the Ottawa-Charlottetown round of constitutional negotiations. According to this approach, a government does not need a theory of liberalism or a vision of Canadian federalism. A government reads polls and plugs holes here and there. The French expression for this is "Parer au plus pressé."

In 1993, the language issue will become pressing and, in all likelihood, will be dealt with in a manner that will render our political life messy once again. That's about all I know with some certainty in the first days of this new year.

Guy Laforest is Associate Professor of Political Science/Département de science politique, Université Laval. Quebec Report is a regular feature of Canada Watch.

Canada Watch welcomes submissions on issues of current national interest. Submissions should be a maximum of 1,000 words. The deadline for consideration in our March issue is Tuesday, February 23, 1993. Write or fax us at:

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LEGAL REPORT

POLITICS, PATRONAGE AND THE SENATE

by *Jamie Cameron*

BEWARE THE DELUGE

Robert Sheppard has predicted that a "deluge of much more partisan patronage" is "sure to follow" Prime Minister Mulroney's appointment of General de Chastelain as Canadian ambassador to the United States. Rumours of the prime minister's imminent departure from politics and a "tingly end-of-era feeling in the air" have fed rumours that there will be at least a wave, if not a full deluge, of patronage appointments.

As currently constituted, the Senate consists of 49 Conservatives, 41 Liberals, and 5 Independents, or 95 in all — several members short of its full complement. Seats are waiting to be filled, including the vacancy created some time ago by the death of Alberta's first elected senator, Stan Waters.

The circumstances recall another prime minister's departure from politics, and John Turner's defence, in the heat of a leadership debate, that he had been bound to honour Trudeau's "patronage" appointments. Today, Prime Minister Mulroney also has the opportunity, before withdrawing from public life, to reward his political friends and further solidify Conservative strength in the Senate.

A SINGLE E SENATE?

In October 1989, Waters was elected to represent Albertans in the Senate under the provincial *Senatorial Selection Act*. Yet it took "eight months of cajoling," in the months immediately preceding the deadline for ratification of the Meech Lake

Accord, before Prime Minister Mulroney would appoint him as a senator. Current demands that the prime minister defer Senate appointments until elections can be held invoke that precedent.

Meanwhile, in October 1992, a majority of Canadians voting in the national referendum, including Albertans, rejected the Charlotte-town Accord. The accord would have entrenched a Triple E Senate — elected, equal, and "effective" — in Canada's constitution. Had the referendum question been affirmed, Albertans might have had a chance to elect a replacement for Senator Waters. However, having followed Reform party leader Preston Manning's advice to vote "no," Alberta is "already at a disadvantage," the prime minister claims. As a result of the accord's failure, Senate appointments will remain, as always, a matter of executive prerogative.

During the referendum debate, Preston Manning stated that if there were a resounding "no," "[t]he credibility of the government to manage constitutional change will be zero." More recently, Manning declared that "[t]he prime minister's resolve to continue to appoint senators shows a foolish and arrogant disregard for the wishes of Albertans and a majority of Canadians." He charged that Mulroney "has no intention of learning anything from the constitutional referendum."

MORATORIUM

Meanwhile, Lorne Nystrom, the federal NDP's constitutional critic, called for a moratorium on Senate appointments. In his view, the prime minister should wait until "we sort out whether we're going to abolish the place or reform the place." "It's an insult," he added, "to have an unelected parliamentary institution in 1992."

Along the same lines, Liberal leader Jean Chrétien has suggested

that the prime minister defer Senate appointments until after the next federal election. He argues that the appointments issue is not legal or constitutional but moral: if it was wrong in 1984 for Liberal Prime

"Although his power of appointment is unfettered, Mulroney has no mandate to reform the Senate unilaterally, even on an incremental basis, by conceding the 'elected' element of the Triple E proposal. Were he to do so, his actions would confer a measure of democratic legitimacy on the Senate."

Minister Turner to rubber stamp Trudeau's appointments, then it must be just as wrong in 1992 for Mulroney to make a string of similar patronage appointments.

Chrétien is right that the prime minister is not required by law or constitutional imperative to accede to any of these demands. It is a different question whether he should.

POLITICS, PATRONAGE AND CHOICES

Although his power of appointment is unfettered, Mulroney has no mandate to reform the Senate unilaterally, even on an incremental basis, by conceding the "elected" element of the Triple E proposal. Were he to do so, his actions would confer a measure of democratic legitimacy on the Senate. Thus validated, the institution might be induced to exercise its legal authority, thereby becoming a Double E Senate and an "effective" source of political authority. The constraints the accord would have imposed on the Senate's power would not apply. In the absence of any democratic mandate to do so, it is surely inappropriate for the prime minister to introduce such fundamental change into our democratic institutions.

Nor is a moratorium politically viable. With discussion of constitutional reform on hold indefinitely, why would the prime minister forfeit the right to make these appointments? A federal election must be held no later than November 1993. Should Mulroney agree to defer Senate appointments, there would be nothing to prevent a new governing party from filling those vacancies immediately after the election.

During the leadership debate of the 1984 election, Brian Mulroney pointed a finger at then Prime Minister Turner and shouted, in reference to Trudeau's patronage appointments, that "you had a choice." Turner went down to defeat in that election. Likewise, the people of Canada had a choice in October 1992, and they decided not to endorse the accord.

Now the prime minister has a choice. And it is purely political: a deluge of patronage appointments may compromise his party's chances of re-election. But it would not be illegal, unconstitutional, or even contrary to parliamentary tradition in Canada.

Jamie Cameron is Associate Professor and Assistant Dean at Osgoode Hall Law School. Legal Report is a regular feature of Canada Watch.

CW UPDATE

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

by David Johnson

KLEIN WINS ALBERTA PREMIERSHIP

On December 5, Ralph Klein won the Alberta Progressive Conservative leadership contest, thus becoming the premier of the province. Klein succeeded to the position vacated by Don Getty by defeating Nancy Betkowski in a hard-fought runoff race in the two-stage contest. With over 77,000 votes cast in the province-wide election open to all party members, Klein won 59.1 percent of the vote to Betkowski's 40.5 percent. It is interesting to note that in the subsequent selection of a cabinet, none of those who had challenged Klein for the leadership were included. This may be an indication that the divisions in the party that the contest exposed have yet to be mended. A general provincial election is expected sometime this year.

NAFTA SIGNED

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was formally signed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Presidents George Bush and Carlos Salinas on December 17 in separate ceremonies in Ottawa, Washington, and Mexico City. The signing marks official executive approval of the agreement by all three negotiating governments. To become effective, the agreement must now receive legislative ratification in the three countries. Such endorsement is virtually guaranteed in Mexico, while in this country the federal government is expected to introduce implementing legislation before Parliament in February. Approval by the late spring should

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be forthcoming. In the United States, President-Elect Bill Clinton has expressed his general support for the agreement as written, while stipulating that his reservations regarding the need to strengthen environmental protection and job protection provisions can be addressed through "side agreements" with the governments of Mexico and Canada. This approach by the new president should result in the agreement receiving approval in the U.S. Congress before the expiry of the fast-track negotiating authority on June 1.

FEDERAL CABINET SHUFFLE

The new year began with a minor rearrangement in the composition of the federal Cabinet. Having previously indicated that they would not be seeking re-election, the prime minister announced, on January 4, that Jake Epp, minister of energy, Marcel Masse, minister of defence, Robert de Cotret, secretary of state, Gerald Merrithew, minister of veterans' affairs, and William Winegard, minister of science, were retiring from Cabinet. In turn, the prime minister transferred Kim Campbell from Justice to a new Department of Defence and Veter-

ans' Affairs. In other moves, Pierre Blais was shifted from Consumer and Corporate Affairs to Justice, while Pierre Vincent, a newcomer to the front benches, assumed responsibility for the former ministry. Also, William McKnight was moved to Energy, Mines and Resources from Agriculture. Charles Mayer became the new agriculture minister while retaining responsibility as minister of state for grains and oilseeds. Furthermore, Monique Landry became secretary of state, while Thomas Hockin assumed responsibility for science, as well as being minister of state for small businesses and tourism. Mary Collins retained her position as minister responsible for the status of women while gaining responsibility for western economic diversification. Finally, Pauline Browes became minister of state for employment and immigration.

NEW AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON

On January 6, the prime minister appointed General John de Chastelain, the former chief of defence staff, to be the next Canadian ambassador to the United States.

The appointment caught many foreign affairs analysts by surprise, given General de Chastelain's lack of background and experience in the field of trade policy. The general himself, however, was quick to assert that he will immediately devote himself to becoming briefed in the intricacies of the Canadian-U.S. trade relationship, while stressing that his former position provided him with ample experience in managing complex policy fields and engaging in foreign-diplomatic relations. The appointment may also suggest that the federal government is anticipating that international peacekeeping and "peacemaking" initiatives may increase in coming years, with this country thus needing a well-respected military expert closely involved in the Washington diplomatic community. Meanwhile, the vice chief of defence staff, Admiral John Anderson will assume General de Chastelain's responsibilities until a replacement is named by Kim Campbell, the new minister of defence.

David Johnson is Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Brock University.



CANADA WATCH CALENDAR

December 5	Ralph Klein chosen as premier of Alberta, defeating Nancy Betkowski in a runoff election.	January 23	Prince Edward Island Liberal party to choose successor to retiring Premier Joe Ghiz.
December 17	North American Free Trade Agreement was signed by Prime Minister Mulroney and by Presidents Bush and Salinas.	February 1	House of Commons resumes sitting.
January 4	Federal Cabinet shuffle announced by Prime Minister Mulroney, featuring retirements of five ministers and the move of Kim Campbell from Justice to Defence.	Late February	Implementing legislation for North American Free Trade Agreement to be tabled in the House of Commons.
			Federal budget
		March 2	Last day for submission of North American Free Trade Agreement (and any associated agreements) to U.S. Congress under "fast-track" negotiating authority.