CANADA WATCH

Practical Analysis of Constitutional and Other Key National Issues

The *Real* Failure of the Referendum

The "Quebec question" remains unresolved

Kenneth McRoberts

For over 30 years now, Canada's political leaders have repeatedly sought to find a way to resolve "the Quebec question." Once again they have failed. This is the real significance of the referendum defeat.

In the early 1960s, social and political change in French Quebec produced demands for fundamental change in Canada's political system. There were two thrusts to these demands: one had to do with the status of French and of French-speakers within federal institutions and Canada as a whole; the other, the more powerful one, had to do with the status of Quebec. French-Canadian nationalism, which had roots going back to the 1820s, was transformed into a Québécois nationalism. Within this new nationalism, the Quebec government needed not only the status of a "national" state but additional powers so that it could meet the pressing needs of a modern Quebec society.

Inevitably, these demands became focused on the constitution, concerned as they were with the fundamental relationship between Quebec and the rest of the country. As a result, English Canada was drawn with great reluctance into a debate over constitutional revision.

Past Failures To Resolve the "Quebec Question"

Out of this debate emerged the Victoria Charter of 1971, which would have linked constitutional repatriation with a new charter of rights, faithfully reflecting the priorities of Prime Minister Trudeau. Reflecting these same priorities, the Victoria Charter did little to strengthen the powers of Quebec, or the provinces in general. It was primarily for this reason that public opposition in Quebec forced Premier Robert Bourassa to reject the Charter, to the dismay of all the other first ministers.

In 1982 the constitution was repatriated and included the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which constitutionally entrenched the status of French and English as official languages. Once again, however, the division of powers was virtually untouched and Quebec remained very much "a province like the others." And, once again, the Quebec government refused to sign. In this refusal, it was supported by large numbers of Quebec federalists. Thus, Canada's constitution was repatriated without the consent of the second-largest province.

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It was to remedy this fundamental flaw that, in 1987, the first ministers agreed to the Meech Lake Accord. Beyond reinforcing some provincial powers, the Accord explicitly declared Quebec to be a "distinct society." Largely for this reason, the Accord was rejected by public opinion in the rest of the country — two provincial legislatures allowed it to die. Quebec francophones, who had viewed the accord as an absolute minimum, felt rejected by the rest of the country, and support for Quebec sovereignty soared.

The Charlottetown Accord's Fatal Flaws

Now, yet another constitutional venture has ended in fiasco. This time, of course, the rejection extended to both English Canada and Quebec. Ironically, Canadians were "united" through their common opposition to the agreement, which had been intended to bring them together.

Once again, the key to constitutional failure lies with the "Quebec question." After all, on July 7 Prime Minister Mulroney and the English-Canadian premiers announced their agreement to a constitutional accord that had a good chance of securing popular approval in English Canada. In particular, the July 7 agreement clearly responded to the primary English-Canadian constitutional demand: make the Senate "equal, elected, and effective."

If, however, the agreement responded to English Canada's concerns, it did not respond to Quebec's. Premier Bourassa had not even been at the bargaining table. Yet, in their effort to render the agreement acceptable to Quebec, the first ministers proceeded to modify the accord along lines that virtually doomed it to rejection — not only in English Canada but in Quebec as well.

As ever, the main focus of Quebec's demands had been the division of powers. Given English Canada's continued commitment to a strong federal government, the logic of Quebec's needs was an "asymmetry" in powers, through which the Quebec government could exercise jurisdictions that the other provinces preferred to leave with the federal government. Beyond affording the additional powers that Quebec wished, asymmetry had the added appeal of reflecting Quebec's distinctiveness. Precisely for this reason, English-Canadian leaders presumed that asymmetry in powers could not be sold in English Canada. Thus, they sought to render the package acceptable to Quebec by downscaling the powers of the reformed Senate and by increasing Quebec (and Ontario) representation in the House of Commons. They even went so far as to guarantee Quebec 25 percent of Commons seats in perpetuity. (In effect, unwilling to introduce asymmetry into the division of powers, the first ministers ended up introducing it into the House of Commons.) In the process, they undermined much of English Canada's support for the accord. In particular, the 25 percent guarantee produced a storm of opposition in English Canada.

"In sum, this most recent episode clearly proves, if proof were still necessary, that the Canadian constitution cannot be revised without affording greater powers to Quebec. Given the continued support of English Canada for a strong federal government, accommodating Quebec means asymmetrical federalism. ... The problem is that we may have just missed our last opportunity to put this option to work."

Ironically, the guarantee of Commons seats appears to have mobilized little support in Quebec. After all, the provision had not even been proposed by Quebec, and it could not compensate for the fact that Quebec had not secured its long-sought additional powers.

The Necessity of Asymmetry

Clearly, the political and ideological forces in English Canada arrayed against asymmetry are powerful. It is, however, also clearer now than ever that only on this basis can the "Quebec question" be resolved. In fact, among the documents prepared by top Quebec civil servants that were recently published in *L'Actualité*, there is the intimation that even the stronger Senate proposed in the July 7 agreement would have been acceptable to Quebec — if it were accompanied by additional powers.

Asymmetry could be secured in a couple of ways. Certain jurisdictions might be formally assigned to Quebec alone, among the provinces. Or jurisdictions could be made available to both levels of government with the right of provinces to occupy them exclusively through the exercise of paramountcy.

To be sure, if federal measures do not apply to Quebec, Quebec MPs probably should not vote on them; that would be the price of asymmetry. Conceivably, cabinet portfolios in areas from which Quebec has extensively "opted out" would not go to Quebec MPs — although two Quebec ministers have administered the Canada Pension Plan (which does not apply to Quebec) without generating any protest. Over the years, a certain number of scholars have developed schemes through which federal institutions might take asymmetry into account. In fact, as Gordon

Laxer of the University of Alberta recently noted, asymmetry might actually have some appeal for western Canada: when Quebec MPs do not vote on a measure, western and Atlantic Canada will control a majority of the House seats.

In sum, this most recent episode clearly proves, if proof were still necessary, that the Canadian constitution cannot be revised without affording greater powers to Quebec. Given the continued support of English Canada for a strong federal government, accommodating Quebec means asymmetrical federalism. In all likelihood, such a formal asymmetry in powers would complicate the functioning of our central institutions, and would require a certain degree of innovation and even improvisation. That, however, might be a small price to pay when compared with the costs in energy and time of Canada's interminable constitutional debate.

The problem is that we may have just missed our last opportunity to put this option to work. A great many Canadians have concluded from this last episode that Canada's constitution *cannot* be revised. Few political leaders will be prepared to risk yet another fiasco. Thus, when Quebeckers once again raise the constitutional question, as inevitably they will, the response will be that there is only one alternative to the status quo — Quebec sovereignty. Under these conditions they may well conclude that sovereignty is the answer. Compared with the potential costs of this answer, for Quebec and for the rest of Canada, asymmetry looks like a bargain.

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After the Referendum

by Ramsay Cook

Once the noxious rhetorical gases generated by the referendum have dissipated, the good sense of the majority of Canadian voters may gradually become obvious — and for two reasons. For a time, the constitutional question, or at least the Quebec-Ottawa part of it, will slip to the margins of the political agenda. A minor, but only temporary, respite. More important, however, is what the voters said about the future options available to constitution makers in Canada. What they said is hardly novel, but they shouted it so loudly that not even a journalist should mistake the message.

Quebec's Quest for Special Status

Over the last 30 years, two constants have been present in our constitutional discussions, and those constants were reaffirmed during the referendum. The first has been Quebec's quest for a status reflecting its self-description as "une province pas comme les autres." The second constant has been the unwillingness of the other provinces, or the federal government, to accept that claim at least as far as it involved transferring federal powers to Quebec alone. Out of the conflict between these views has emerged a view of the federation that was once rejected by most scholars and federal politicians — namely, a federalism in which all provinces are equal with a central government that is merely primus inter pares. Ironically, this view of the federation has actually reduced the de facto "special status" that Quebec has traditionally had in such matters as Senate representation and in constitutional amendment.

Quebec's quest for a formal "special status" under whatever name — "two nations," "distinct society," "asymmetrical federalism" — represents an understandable attempt to enjoy the benefits of both federalism and independence. As often as not, it is advocated by politicians and academics who view "special status" as a version of étapisme, the gradual evolution of Quebec from colony to province to "distinct society" to nation. It is almost invariably the position of those who have only a marginal interest in the efficient operation of the Ottawa level of government since their primary, sometimes exclusive, focus is on Quebec. That probably explains why no advocate of "special status" has ever seriously attempted to provide a blueprint explaining the manner in which "asymmetry" would work — that is, the role of Quebec federal members of parliament in areas where Quebec had withdrawn from federal jurisdictions. Philip Resnick has at least made an attempt, but the result is hardly promising.

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Two Concerns

The rejection of the "special status" option by non-Quebeckers has reflected two concerns. The first is the suspicion that "special status" really means "special" treatment — as, of course, it does, although special treatment may be justified. More significantly, however, "special status" has been looked at skeptically

because most federal and provincial politicians cannot conceive of a system in which one province operates on a half-in, half-out basis. The problem here is simple: the advocates of "special status" have never proposed a workable plan — except, of course, the open-ended ad hocery of opting out.

During the Trudeau-Lévesque years, the "special status" option virtually disappeared, only to return, smelling of mothballs and the Queen's

"... Quebec federalists must now face the obvious conclusion that there are really only two options for their province. One is independence ... [t]he other is a federal system not very different from the existing one ..."

University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, as federal Conservatives celebrated the shotgun nuptials between Brian Mulroney and Lucien Bouchard at Meech Lake. The October referendum once again demonstrated that the "special status" option remains unacceptable outside Quebec while its appeal in Quebec remains strong. So what conclusions should be drawn?

The first is that Quebec federalists must now face the obvious conclusion that there are really only two options for their province. One is independence, the logical choice for Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont. The other is a federal system not very different from the existing one in which Quebec's distinct society will be protected by the efficient exercise of its existing powers, its political clout at the federal level, the notwithstanding clause and a pragmatic, gradual redistribution of powers as need is demonstrated. As Quebeckers are weighing these options, Canadians elsewhere in the country will have to realize that they will be obliged, in the near future, to accept Quebec's choice in the full understanding that the preferred choice may well be independence. This clearing of the air is the first benefit of October 26.

The Aboriginal Issue

The second benefit is that the issue of self-government for the native people can, or at least should, now be treated separately from the other questions with which it was unfortunately entangled in the Charlottetown Accord. If the various governments, separately or together, can take the framework for self-government established in the Accord and flesh it out in a way that will remove the doubts of both natives and non-natives about the many fuzzy edges left unspecified at Charlottetown, there is no reason why this issue should not be amicably resolved. Some native leaders have emerged from the referendum depressed and bitter, and that is understandable, but their task may have been made easier in the long run if they can now present the case for self-government as valuable in its own right rather than as simply a bargaining chip in the larger constitutional lottery that federal-provincial relations has become since 1984.

One can only hope that the native people and their supporters will press at once for renewed discussions of self-government because that would result in yet another positive result. It might prevent the Mulroney government from fulfilling its promise to concentrate exclusively on the economy. Given the government's record in that field to date, single-minded concentration may produce results even more disastrous than its record on the constitution.

Ramsay Cook is Professor of History at York University.

Canada After Charlottetown

Picking up the pieces won't be as easy as some imagine

by Patrick J. Monahan

In the weeks immediately following the October 26 referendum, political leaders and pundits were literally tripping over themselves in their hurry to minimize the consequences of the sweeping "no" vote. The same authorities who had been predicting dis-

"Some have argued that Charlottetown was simply the rejection of a particular set of amendments and does not foreclose negotiation of a 'better deal' in the future. But the practical problem is in imagining what this 'better deal' would look like."

aster if the Accord were defeated now suddenly reversed course. With the body still warm, we were told that the death of Charlottetown was not a "no" to Canada, but rather a "no" to the country's political elites and a "no" to a bad deal.

The money markets certainly seemed persuaded. On October 27, the Canadian dollar held firm and the Toronto Stock Exchange registered its third biggest gain of the year. Onward to the economy!

But the consequences of the failure of Charlottetown are unlikely to be as insignificant as these post-referendum analyses would have us believe. The defeat of the Accord is likely to provide a major boost to the forces of fragmentation, regionalism, and division, at least over the medium to long term.

Consider the following political realities facing Canada after the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord.

1. *We may now have a constitution that is, for all practical intents and purposes, virtually unamendable.*

Some have argued that Charlottetown was simply the rejection of a particular set of amendments and does not foreclose negotiation of a "better deal" in the future. But the practical problem is in imagining what this "better deal" would look like.

For Quebeckers, a "better deal" means more powers for the province of Quebec. But Quebec's demand runs up against opposition elsewhere to any further devolution, combined with a categorical rejection of any "special status" for Quebec.

For the west, a "better deal" means a stronger Senate with equal representation from each province, and no "special guarantees" for Quebec (such as the 25 percent floor in the House of Commons). But the only reason that Quebec was prepared to accept an equal Senate was that its political weight in the House of Commons and the federal Cabinet was guaranteed. Remove the guarantee of Commons seats and the equal Senate becomes totally unpalatable for Quebec.

Finally, for aboriginals, a "better deal" means greater recognition of their "sovereignty" within Canada. But this demand runs up against the concerns of non-aboriginal Canadians, whose interests must also be factored into the equation.

In short, although Canadians in all parts of the country apparently believe that a "better deal" is possible, it is difficult to see how this is the case. Any attempt to improve the position of one group or constituency will immediately raise a red flag elsewhere.

2. *The practical unamendability of the current constitution is reinforced by the fact that any future amendments must be approved by referendum.*

The October 26 referendum set an important precedent. Having consulted the people directly on one occasion, it makes it practically impossible to avoid consulting them on all others.

This is an important gain for democracy. But it further narrows the passageway through which constitutional amendments must pass in order to become law.

The international experience suggests that the only type of constitutional amendment likely to survive a referendum is one that is narrow, focused, and specific. Indeed, in Australia, it is virtually axiomatic that any proposed amendment must be of the "stand-alone" variety if it is to succeed in a referendum. Complicated packages of amendments, such as the Charlottetown Accord, are not put before the people for the simple reason that they are almost always defeated.

"Fortunately, we are at least a year away from the next showdown on Quebec's political future. And, unlike following the demise of Meech, there is no sense within the province of Quebec that they have been 'rejected' by the rest of the country."

But here's the problem. We in Canada are required to deal with all outstanding constitutional demands at the same time (this being one of the major "lessons" of the failure of Meech Lake) and thus are precluded from proposing simple, "stand-alone" amendments. Any future constitutional package would be of the Charlottetown variety—complicated and sprawling—and would be just as vulnerable in a referendum.

3. *The defeat of Charlottetown thus means that the choice for Quebeckers is between the status quo and sovereignty.*

Since the early 1960s, federalists in Quebec have built their constitutional strategy on a program of "renewed federalism." Even Pierre Trudeau felt it necessary to promise Quebeckers something called "renewed federalism" in return for their vote in the 1980 referendum. There has been no major political party in Quebec for the past generation that has defended the constitutional status quo.

But the reality is that "renewed federalism," if it involves formal constitutional amendments, has been exposed as a pipe dream. This forces Quebec federalists back to a defence of the status quo, perhaps with some modest "administrative improvements" to enhance Quebec's authority over such fields as labour market training.

As Mr. Bourassa is fond of observing, a week in politics is a lifetime, while a year is an eternity. Fortunately, we are at least a year away from the next showdown on Quebec's political future. And, unlike following the demise of Meech, there is no sense within the province of Quebec that they have been "rejected" by the rest of the country. But the looming political battle over the future of Quebec will now be fought on ground that has been hand-picked by Lucien Bouchard and Jacques Parizeau. In a campaign that pits sovereignty against the status quo, even the Vegas bookies would be well advised to decline posting any odds.

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What Part of "No" Will They Understand?

by Janine Brodie

On October 26, 1992, for only the third time in our history, Canadians went to the polls to vote in a national referendum. Unlike the previous two experiences, this time Canadians were not offered a straightforward choice on a single issue. Instead, they were asked to endorse a complex and incomplete constitutional package whose details were decided only two months earlier and, as we all know, Canadians responded with a resounding "no!"

The vote scuttled the Charlottetown Accord, but it is less clear what this said or foreshadowed about Canadian politics. Brian Mulroney spelled out his interpretation during the referendum campaign. "If the vote is No," he said, "it's all over. It's No to the aboriginals. It's No to Senate reform. It's No to the 31 gains for Quebec and the gains for the other provinces. It's No to everything."

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Wishful Thinking

The media, political pundits, and public alike, however, seem to be in a collective state of denial about the implications of the vote or Mulroney's statement. There is a growing consensus that the "no" vote provides an opportunity to put the constitution on the back burner and get on with "politics as usual," especially the pressing task of reviving the economy. More incredibly, Michael Bliss argued that the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord represented a vote for the constitutional status quo—a legitimization of the deal that Trudeau struck in 1981-1982 without the consent of Quebec.

All of this, it strikes me, is so much wishful thinking. There was no single meaning of the "no" vote. If anything, it demonstrated with stark clarity the multiple, deep, and contradictory visions that now compete on the constitutional terrain. These multiple meanings suggest that there is little common ground left in Canada on which to construct a new national consensus and, the referendum process itself may have only served to congeal and widen the existing gulfs. Contrary to the wilfully myopic predictions, "politics as usual" in Canada's foreseeable future will be an ongoing, if not intensified, politics of fragmentation and crisis mismanagement.

The Catch-Up Game

Perhaps, this is no more obvious than with the case of Quebec. Some pundits took comfort in the fact that Quebec and the rest of Canada finally seemed to be in agreement in their disagreement with the constitutional package, but the reasons why Quebec and the rest of Canada rejected the Accord were entirely different. On one side, "no" meant that Quebec got too much and, on the other, "no" meant that it got too little.

The Charlottetown Accord represented a moment on a steadily escalating climb for autonomy in Quebec. For the past 30 years, English Canada has been caught in a game of "catch up" with Quebec nationalism—a game that it is losing. Each time the rest of Canada is prepared to respond to Quebec's aspirations, it has already moved another step up the ladder. It has become increasingly apparent that the accommodation of Quebec within Confederation will ultimately depend on a radical rethinking of Canadian federalism that would allow for an asymmetric political union. The idea of such a "special status" for Quebec, however, has and will continue to be resisted by both the public and other provincial governments. The Charlottetown Accord, like the Meech Lake Accord before it, failed to bridge this fundamental impasse, but unless some kind of bridge is constructed and soon, it is hard to disagree with PQ leader Parizeau that the referendum represented just a brief "detour" on the road to independence.

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On the Back Burner

The same might be said about the demands of the aboriginal peoples for self-government. After decades of frustration, aboriginal issues edged to the top of the constitutional agenda and native leaders were invited to the bargaining table. The Canada Round raised the expectations of the aboriginal peoples that the days of colonialism and constitutional limbo had finally passed. When the "no" votes collided on October 26, however, these expectations were dashed. The native leaders were openly bitter and cynical

about the constitutional reform process. These justifiable sentiments were only further reinforced when Justice Minister Campbell informed the native leadership the next day that the "no" vote meant that she did not have the mandate to negotiate fundamental changes in the status quo. So what does "politics as usual" mean here? The issue has been relegated to the back burner where, if left unattended, it will most certainly simmer and then explode.

It is perhaps less obvious, but equally important, to recognize that the Canada Round and its aftermath also hardened divisions within the aboriginal community itself. The authority of the frontline organizations has been eroded and deep divisions have grown between treaty and non-treaty Indians, feminists and non-feminists, as well as between traditionalists and, for lack of a better term, modernists, and somehow these divisions have been taken to mean that it is acceptable that the aboriginal constitutional agenda was thwarted. This, of course, is the most offensive form of chauvinism. It reduces the diversity of the aboriginal peoples to some amorphous "other" that is expected to speak in a single voice—a condition that "we" as Canadians do not apply to ourselves. Perhaps even more offensive is the idea that these issues will lay dormant until "we" elect to return to the table. The "no" vote denied this community its first steps on the road to self-determination. Whether this happened by accident or intention, the consequences remain the same.

Yes and No

I voted "yes" on October 26, not because I thought that it would end our constitutional crisis but, instead, because it established some common ground. I also voted "yes" because of what was not there—the federal government's neo-liberal economic agenda that appeared in the initial federal proposals. The economic union proposals were flatly rejected during the public round and sidetracked in the political accords attached to the final document, but this repudiation seems to be the part of "no" that the federal government chose not to understand. Only days after the referendum defeat, it announced plans to drastically reduce the federal government and released its *Prosperity Agenda*, which contains precisely the same neo-liberal prescriptions it tried to constitutionalize in the Canada Round. It may be that the next constitutional round — and there will be a next one — will be more democratized. In the meantime, however, the "no" vote has given the federal Conservatives a green light to try to realize as much of their economic agenda as they can before Canadians once again go to the polls.

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The Referendum in Canada: A US Perspective

by Stephen Blank

We can view the referendum, obviously enough, as the outcome of uniquely Canadian forces. From another perspective, however, the whole constitutional crisis can be seen in terms of wider developments that affect not only Canada but other industrial nations as well, not least the United States.

In both Canada and the United States, economic globalization is eroding the capacity of central governments to manage what are no longer national economies, to protect regions from the impact of changes in international price movements, or to create durable prosperity.

The Growth of the States and the Provinces

In both countries, not just in Canada, changes in the federal system are shifting many new responsibilities and powers to states and provinces. The first great modern revolution in American federalism, born of the Depression and World War II, concentrated enormous spending and policy-making power in Washington. The second, largely a response to the changing place of the United States in the global economy, dispersed much of this back to the states. Federal grants, which accounted for 26 percent of state spending in 1980, now account for only 18 percent, and policy making and financial responsibilities have gone hand in hand.

Both countries confront serious institutional frictions accentuated by this shifting balance of power between central and state/provincial authorities. In Canada, the failure of central governmental institutions to represent regional interests has long been a source of frustration among non-central Canadians,[1] and demands for institutional reform increased dramatically in the debate over the Charlottetown proposals. On the US side, state governments are typically poorly structured to bear the new social and fiscal responsibilities they now confront. Archaic state fiscal systems and state legislatures that overrepresent rural interests are common problems.

"In the emerging system of governance in North America, national sovereignty will be unbundled both downward and upward and the boundaries of new systems of authority will differ from traditional national borders."

These tensions are not limited to North America, but arise in other industrial nations, particularly those with federal systems of government. The *Financial Times* described in very familiar terms intense disagreement over Germany's federal system and control over its foreign policy: "At stake is how far the states will be given an effective veto of any future transfer of sovereignty to European Community institutions, and how far they will be given co-decision-making rights with the Bonn Government on EC legislation. Senior German officials accuse the states of seeking to turn the country into a loose confederation."[2]

We cannot conceptualize these changes in terms of the transfer or devolution of authority within existing federal systems. The direction of change is not toward a "borderless" world, but toward more complex political organizations. As national borders no longer define the boundaries of social systems, those boundaries will assume a wider range of shapes. For example, efforts to heighten competitive advantage are more likely to be undertaken successfully, for many sectors at least, regionally or locally, rather than nationally and, similarly, education is more likely to evolve as a local or regional rather than a national responsibility. But many environmental issues transcend regional or even national borders and few would deny the need to maintain national or international rules that ensure economic openness.

A general trend toward devolution will create the need to re-centralize authority in some areas. Standards and rules, for example, are required to maintain a "level playing field" in terms of trade, treatment of investment, and fair competition.

Unbundling Sovereignty

In the emerging system of governance in North America, national sovereignty will be unbundled both downward and upward and the boundaries of new systems of authority will differ from traditional national borders. Competition among authorities for control over different systems will heighten and could well dominate politics for the foreseeable future. Alice Rivlin, one of the best-known American economists, emphasizes the need "to sort out functions of government—both between the federal government and the states and within the states—to clarify missions and make sure everyone knows who is responsible for which activities."[3] Barring some sort of ecological emergency, the revival of aggressive authoritarian rule in the former Soviet Union, or some yet unforeseen disaster, sorting out who is responsible for what is

probably going to be the most difficult problem we will face over the next decades.

As national sovereignty and the capacity of central governments to guarantee prosperity erode, it is scarcely surprising that there is a strong economic nationalist/protectionist backlash or that this movement unites groups on the Canadian left and the American right and much of the North American labour movement. Groups on Canada's left are as fiercely determined to preserve Canadian sovereignty as those on the American right, while the restructuring of North American industry has been borne heavily on the backs of industrial workers.

"The grinding recession, the battering that American and, even more, Canadian firms have taken, and the escalating number of lost jobs keep eyes focused on shares of a shrinking pie."

The grinding recession, the battering that American and, even more, Canadian firms have taken, and the escalating number of lost jobs keep eyes focused on shares of a shrinking pie. The pain is more intense because the impact of globalization comes on top of an ongoing revolution in the nature of production. Driven by slow growth, heightened global competition, and the availability of new technology, the structure of production and employment is changing in the 1990s in a way comparable only to the revolution of mass production in the 1880s and '90s.

One cannot deny, finally, that there is danger that political systems could lurch in unexpected directions. History is not short of ironies. Economists from Smith to Marx believed the thrust of capitalism was fundamentally international and would destroy the surviving remnants of medieval state systems. But the emergence of the new industrial era at the end of the 19th century coincided not with internationalism driven by international markets or by international classes, but rather with intense and vicious nationalism.

The danger is that the growing regionalization of the North American economy could lead to fragmentation, regional trade barriers, and exclusiveness, or to efforts to revive old national sovereignties, but the opportunities are enormous: enhanced efficiency, more rapid growth, and greater regional variety and autonomy.

1 See R. Kent Weaver, "Political Institutions and Canada's Constitutional Crisis," in R. Kent Weaver, ed., *The Collapse of Canada?* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992) and Peter Brimelow, *The Patriot Game: National Dreams and Political Realities* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1986), chapter 2.

2 *The Financial Times*, June 12, 1992.

3 Alice Rivlin, *Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, the States and the Federal Government* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 180.

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Unravelling Charlottetown's Web

by Bruce Ryder

What does the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord mean for the future of constitutional and political reform? The referendum result cannot be interpreted as a ratification of the status quo. Our ongoing constitutional crisis is a result of our failure to renew Canadian federalism to give positive constitutional expression to regional and cultural differences. The constitutional status quo is unacceptable because it denies the outer regions an effective voice at the centre, it has been fundamentally altered without Quebec's consent, and it has formed the basis for the colonization of aboriginal peoples and their lands.

After October 26, the outer provinces still want in, Quebec still seeks greater powers and autonomy within or without the Canadian federation, and the aboriginal peoples still aspire to a post-colonial regime premised on respect for treaty rights and their inherent right to self-government. These profound and persistent forces for change will not dissipate; rather, they will be channelled into political struggles within the existing constitution in the short term, and into new constitutional reform efforts in the not-too-distant future.

The Possibilities of Ordinary Politics

Many of the goals sought to be achieved by the Charlottetown Accord can be pursued within the existing constitutional structure. The defeat of the Accord may well have the salutary effect of focusing more energy on the possibilities of "ordinary" politics. The amount of energy devoted by our political leaders to constitutional reform has diverted attention from their failure to

exploit avenues of progressive reform that are in no way precluded by the existing constitution.

For example, there is nothing in the existing constitution that prevents the federal and provincial governments from respecting the inherent aboriginal right to self-government, as the Ontario government committed itself to doing in signing the 1991 "statement of political relationship" with aboriginal nations. Moreover, the federal government could take great steps toward justice for native peoples by speeding up the comprehensive land claims process and by establishing a fair process for rectifying treaty violations and clarifying and implementing treaty rights.

Similarly, the federal government and the provinces can continue to enter agreements relating to such matters as immigration and the withdrawal of federal spending in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Under the status quo, the provinces cannot compel the federal government to negotiate intergovernmental agreements, and there is no mechanism for entrenching agreements in the constitution. Nevertheless, if the political will exists, there is ample room for intergovernmental agreements to advance Quebec's aspirations for greater autonomy and reduce overlap and duplication of services as contemplated by the "Roles and Responsibilities" section of the Charlottetown Accord.

Some might object that the referendum vote has rendered illegitimate the pursuit of any of the objectives of the Charlottetown Accord by *political* as well as by *constitutional* means. This objection is misplaced. Canadians rejected a constitutional reform package. The nature of the referendum question makes it impossible to assess whether particular elements of the Accord were supported or rejected, and to what degree. Solutions to specific grievances must now be found within the existing constitutional framework, and as long as political solutions are arrived at through an open and accountable process, the referendum result should not be an impediment.

The Future of Constitutional Reform

In the coming years, we will have to revisit the imperatives of constitutional reform. A number of lessons can be drawn from the combined failure of the Meech Lake and the Charlottetown accords.

First, we must uncouple the demands of Quebec nationalism from the equality of the provinces principle. By linking the two, we end up twisting ourselves into impractical and irrational constitutional pretzels. For example, to accommodate a Quebec veto over future constitutional change, we end up with an extraordinarily rigid amending formula that nobody favours. Regarding the division of powers, translating Quebec's aspirations into a devolution of powers to all provinces leads to an impasse. Inevitably, the rest of Canada's ceiling remains lower than Quebec's floor. Canadians outside Quebec want to preserve or strengthen the powers of the central government; Quebeckers want to strengthen the powers of the National Assembly. Obviously, we can only have both within either an asymmetrical federation or two independent states.

"... we must uncouple the demands of Quebec nationalism from the equality of the provinces principle. By linking the two, we end up twisting ourselves into impractical and irrational constitutional pretzels."

Quebec's needs and aspirations have been the driving force behind much of our constitutional text and practice. Yet Quebec's difference rarely rises out of the subtextual shadows, frequently buried beneath the notion that all provinces must have the same powers and status. The rest of Canada's insistence on denying and repressing the political consequences of Quebec's difference is deeply neurotic. We can only return to a state of constitutional health by clearly accepting that Quebec is not a province like the others. Only then can we proceed to develop rational approaches to the amending formula, the division of powers, and Senate reform.

Second, a process of constitutional reform dominated by the representatives of governments is unacceptable to many Canadians. Although the most recent process was a huge improvement on Meech Lake, we are clearly only part of the way along the tortuous path to a more representative constitutional reform process. Our best chance of developing a constitution acceptable to all Canadians lies in the First Ministers' Conference giving way to a constituent assembly as the forum responsible for developing constitutional reform proposals.

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The Advertising Campaign: Confounding Conventional Wisdom

by David Johnson

A fascinating subplot of the referendum campaign involved the ability of advocates on the No side to develop a grass-roots advertising campaign that rivalled, if not surpassed, in effectiveness the campaign designed by the highly organized, well-funded, and experienced forces of the Yes side. We truly witnessed another David and Goliath story in which David's weapon this time was free-time, prime-time television advertising.

The Law

The genesis of this development was found in the provisions of the *Referendum Act* that require all major broadcasting networks to make available to referendum committees three hours of broadcasting time during prime time. Under rules established by Elections Canada, these blocks of time were divided equally among the Yes and No camps. Individual referendum committees were then invited to apply for an allocation of time, with Elections Canada's decision making being guided by the principles that applicant committees had to represent significant regional or national interests, and that a wide range of opinion should be reflected through the advertising.

The Campaign

These provisions laid the foundation of an advertising campaign that stunned the media moguls of the Yes side. This group possessed an advertising budget of roughly $5 million earmarked for the production of commercials designed by the leading advertising consultants in the country. And allied to this campaign was the allegedly "non-partisan" pro-Canada advertising produced by the federal government. Given this background, the media dubbed the Yes forces the "Dream Team," a seemingly unbeatable coalition.

However, problems quickly emerged. The advertising of the Yes forces tended to be devoted either to "feel good" images of smiling children or to foreboding images of uncertainty and despair should the Accord be rejected. These ads usually did not address the actual details of the Accord. In contrast to this slick advertising, groups on the No side produced low-key, low-budget, sometimes humorous, and substantively hard-hitting ads.

"We truly witnessed another David and Goliath story in which David's weapon this time was free-time, prime-time television advertising."

When such commercials were run in prime time, beside the Yes advertising, two dynamics emerged. One was that the No side gained credibility as an equal competitor to the Yes side; another was that through the difference in tone, No groups were able to identify themselves as those concerned with the Accord's substance, while being most attuned to the interests of common Canadians.

The campaign was clearly a case in which less was more. The greater the expenditure of the Yes side, the more professional the advertising, and the more emotional the message regarding a No vote, the greater the likelihood that ordinary Canadians "tuned out," while believing that the Yes side was seeking to manipulate popular opinion through appeals to sentiment.

The advertising campaign thus stands as a classic counterpoint to the commonly accepted wisdom that the greater the campaign expenditure, the greater the likelihood of campaign success. Given the structure of the advertising campaign, small, disparate, and financially weak parties and interest groups were given the opportunity to compete effectively with governments and their well-endowed supporting parties and groups. The result was an advertising campaign reflective of a far greater diversity of opinion, from a far greater range of political actors, than that generally found in Canadian election campaigns.

The Future

Is there any likelihood that this experiment in democracy will come to be replicated in future election campaigns? Perhaps. No election act currently has any free-time broadcasting provisions matching those found in the *Referendum Act*. The current federal *Election Act* makes provision for a certain amount of free broadcasting time (in 1988—214 minutes) to be made available to all "parties"; the allocation of time to any particular party, though, is proportional to that party's level of support in the last election and the number of seats contested in the current election.

This system benefits major parties that have had representation in the most recent Parliament, and discriminates against small parties with limited past electoral success, and new parties and interest groups. In 1988, for example, the Progressive Conservatives received 101 minutes of free time, the Liberals 46 minutes, and the NDP 35 minutes. In contrast, 14 other small parties received a total of 32 minutes to be shared among themselves; the Reform Party received 2 minutes of free time. No interest groups were

eligible to receive any entitlements, although they were free to engage in any amount of paid advertising.

We can be confident that, given the vested interests of the major parties, this system will not be amended prior to the next federal election. It is quite possible, though, that this system will come under attack both by the smaller parties, especially the Reform Party, and various interest groups, such as NAC. The federal Royal Commission on Electoral Reform (the Lortie Commission) has already launched an attack on the status quo calling for a free-time system more open to the needs and concerns of small parties while still granting a preponderance of free time to major, demonstrably popular parties.

"The advertising campaign thus stands as a classic counterpoint to the commonly accepted wisdom that the greater the campaign expenditure, the greater the likelihood of campaign success."

Reform Potential

With the example of the referendum fresh in mind, the calls for reform may be strong. A future federal government, seeking to demonstrate its interest in democratic reform, may very well move to broaden the free-time provisions in the *Election Act*. And there is clearly great scope for enhancing the ability of small parties, and even interest groups, to have access to free broadcasting time, thereby making the electoral process more open and responsive to the range of public opinion found within this country.

Such a move may even be justified as a quid pro quo for the prohibition or restriction on interest group paid advertising on the grounds that although groups do have a free speech interest in election campaigns, the ability to exercise the right effectively should not be contingent upon the wealth held by any group.

The referendum was, among other things, a demonstration of a more populist form of electoral decision making than we have hitherto seen. The referendum outcome has also been widely interpreted as a rebuke of the traditional, elitist forms of governmental decision making and electioneering to which we have been accustomed. We have now been exposed to a quite different, more democratic approach to the structuring of elections. What Canadians do with this example and this opportunity will say much about whether Canadians are willing to make some radical changes in the way electoral decision making is conducted in this country.

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Canada Watch welcomes submissions on issues of current national interest. Submissions should be a maximum of 1,000 words. The deadline for consideration in our January/February issue is Friday, January 8, 1993. Write or fax us at:

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WESTERN REPORT

Whither Senate Reform?

by Roger Gibbins

On October 26, western Canadians voted massively against the Charlottetown Accord; across the region, 63.1 percent voted "no" compared with 55.4 percent voting "no" in Quebec. In so doing, western Canadians appear to have shut the door on Senate reform by rejecting the first serious constitutional attempt to address chronic regional unrest with parliamentary institutions. How, then, do we explain this rejection and what does the future hold for Senate reform?

Lack of Saliency

In trying to explain why western Canadians rejected the Accord despite its inclusion of Senate reform, three possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that Senate reform lacked the public saliency that many political commentators and academics, including myself, have assumed. If western Canadians were largely indifferent to the issue, then the inclusion of Senate reform did little to enhance the Accord's regional appeal.

More generally, it is not clear that a concern with effective regional representation in parliamentary institutions played a very significant role as western Canadians tried to get a handle on the Accord. My reading of the regional media coverage and public debate suggests that neither this concern nor Senate reform specifically was front and centre. Whether this represents a failure on the Yes side to highlight the Senate reform package or whether the relevancy of Senate reform for the mythical man on the street has been exaggerated in the past is difficult to determine.

"Yes" to Senate Reform, But "No" to This Version

The second possibility may be that many western Canadians saw Senate reform as a highly salient issue, but rejected the specific reform model embedded in the Charlottetown Accord. As I suggested in a previous column (see 1 *Canada Watch* 22, elements of the Charlottetown package were problematic for supporters of Senate reform and, therefore, one could believe strongly in Senate reform and still vote "no." Again, however, media coverage and the public debate do not suggest that negative assessments per se played a major role in the west's rejection of the Charlottetown Accord. Although the Senate package certainly came under critical attack, the attack did not go unchallenged and was not central to the broader referendum debate.

"Yes" to Senate Reform, But Not at Any Price

The third possibility may be that western Canadians were relatively pleased with the Senate reform package, but disliked other aspects of the Accord so much that they were prepared to sacrifice Senate reform. Of the three possibilities, this one strikes me as the most likely. Certainly, other aspects of the Accord, and particularly the 25 percent seat guarantee for Quebec, overshadowed the specifics of the Senate reform in the public debate.

Of course, the three explanations are complementary. If Senate reform had been more salient, then western Canadians may have been prepared to swallow other aspects of the Accord. If the Senate package had been stronger, they might also have been prepared to do so. In any event, they did not, and it appears at first glance that Senate reform has been swept from the nation's political agenda along with most of the other elements in the Charlottetown Accord.

The Future of Senate Reform?

And yet, it would be premature to conclude that Senate reform has disappeared. Admittedly, it is unlikely that the west has enough political muscle, or even enough interest, to resuscitate a national debate on Senate reform. It is difficult to imagine any enthusiasm among western premiers, and particularly Mike Harcourt, for a renewed constitutional debate. Nor do I underestimate the antipathy of Quebec to the Charlottetown Senate package and, indeed, to any Senate reform package.

However, the Senate reformers have a critically important card to play and that is the fact that the existing Senate—unelected, unequal, but with formidable formal powers—still exists. To take one of the best lines from the October 26 media coverage, the quo has no status and the existing Senate will continue to generate pressure for institutional reform.

It is difficult to imagine that we will stumble into the 21st century with the current Senate still in place. The trick will be to find a way to reform the Senate without having to roll reform into a larger constitutional package that would likely suffer the same fate as the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords. More specifically, the challenge will be to find non-constitutional means to reform the Senate and to bring it more into line with the contemporary political culture.

This will not be an easy task, but it need not lie beyond our imaginations and will. It is, however, a task for which leadership must come from the west. Senate reformers elsewhere in the country have been scattered to the winds by the October 26 referendum.

Roger Gibbins is Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary. Western Report is a regular feature of Canada Watch.

QUEBEC REPORT

The Referendum and Its Aftermath in Quebec

by Guy Laforest

The October 26 referendum was Quebec's second action of collective self-determination in 12 years. The question was the same throughout the country, but Quebec administered its own referendum with the law and the regulations of the National Assembly. In an important sense, this was a form of special status. For the second time in 12 years, the federal government and the rest of the country endorsed both the self-determination and the special status of Quebec. Whatever happens in the future concerning the relationship of Quebec with Canada, the referendum of 1992 has reinforced, both for us and for international observers, the status of Quebec as an autonomous political community. Quite frankly, that's about the only positive thing I have to say with regard to our recent referendum experience.

For those who can still remember the hopes that were in the air after the demise of the Meech Lake Accord, or during the fall of 1990, when Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau carried on their shoulders the dignity and the legitimacy of the National Assembly, the present situation is very disappointing indeed. Quebeckers have said "no" to the Ottawa-Charlottetown Accord, but they are still stuck with the constitution that Pierre Trudeau and nine English-speaking premiers imposed on them 10 years ago and all this, in a sense, because Robert Bourassa and his government refused the more radical options recommended to them by most sectors of Quebec society.

Unanswered Questions

There is something more intriguing than the Wilhelmy-Tremblay Affair and the documents leaked to Jean-François Lisée and *L'Actualité*. In June 1992, Mr. Bourassa knew through a number of polls that Quebeckers would have voted massively (65 to 70 percent) to support his "Brussels model"—the creation of two sovereign states associated in an economic union. After such a referendum, the Quebec government would have entered into negotiations with the other governments; if the negotiations had failed, Quebec could have proclaimed its independence unilaterally one year following the date of the referendum.

"Quebeckers have said 'no' to the Ottawa-Charlottetown Accord, but they are still stuck with the constitution that Pierre Trudeau and nine English-speaking premiers imposed on them 10 years ago and all this, in a sense, because Robert Bourassa and his government refused the more radical options recommended to them by most sectors of Quebec society."

Instead of choosing that route, Mr. Bourassa, at some point after the July 7 agreement in Ottawa, decided to return to the multilateral table and ultimately to accept a project that he had to know (this is my hypothesis) the people of Quebec would reject. Mr. Bourassa tells us that he had no choice because the leaders of the other provinces manifested no interest for his Brussels scenario, reacting to this with the subtlety of Jeffrey Simpson. I fail to be convinced by this argument. We need a good investigative reporter to shed some light on what happened this summer in the entourage of Premier Bourassa.

The Future of the Liberal Party

Meanwhile, the consequences of Mr. Bourassa's decision are becoming more and more obvious everyday. The Liberal party will become the voice of the unconditional federalists. Michel Pagé, former minister of national education, started flirting with sovereignty association barely one week after having left the Bourassa cabinet. I doubt that Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont will be either allowed or willing to rejoin the ranks of the Liberal party. Rumours of a third party are starting to emerge with the names of Pierre-Marc Johnson and Claude Béland on the lips of most analysts. After the failure of Meech Lake, Mr. Bourassa pronounced his greatest speech as a statesman. Quebec would remain forever a distinct society, he said memorably at the National Assembly, free to choose its destiny. Many people who trusted him and the tone of his speech on that day feel that they have been used in one of Mr. Bourassa's favourite games—playing for political time. They are not likely to forget.

The Sovereignty Option

The referendum of October 26 was not a triumph for sovereigntists in Quebec. The result was closer than it looks on the surface, at 56 to 44 percent. Two hundred and fifty thousand voters made the difference. With polls telling observers that about 20 percent of card-carrying members of the Liberal party intended to vote "no," one has to conclude that the Allaire-Dumont tandem made the difference. Moreover, this can be said while discounting the albeit marginal effect in Quebec of Pierre Trudeau's pronouncements. With Jacques Parizeau at the helm, despite his unique qualities and the sacrifices he has made over the past few years, the Parti Québécois and the idea of sovereignty will not go beyond 45 percent. The problem is not only with the leadership. The Parti Québécois has still to make a clear choice between the forces of "intégrisme national," represented for instance by Jean Dorion and the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, and the forces coalescing around the idea of a pluralist distinct society.

In the next few years, while the federal party system undergoes a process of fragmentation, Quebec is likely to turn inward and outward. Inward, toward the establishment of a new social contract between majority and minorities, between the various nations forming Quebec society. Outward, to obtain internationally the kind of recognition that remains elusive in Canadian public affairs.

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Quebec Report is a regular feature of Canada Watch.

LEGAL REPORT

A Referendum Post Mortem

by Jamie Cameron

The Charlottetown Accord: Dead On Arrival

At 9:00 p.m. EST on October 26, 1992, one hour after the CBC's referendum coverage had begun, Peter Mansbridge pronounced the Charlottetown Accord DOA: dead on arrival. Across the country, the people's voice was heard, and it spoke definitively against the proposals for constitutional reform. To some, defeat of the referendum signified a return to the status quo.

Others argue that, at a minimum, the referendum changed the amending formula: a condition of public ratification has now been read into the constitution. However, amendments to any constitution are few and far between; that is just as true of Canada's constitution as of any other. Of much greater significance are the referendum's broader implications for democratic discourse and participation.

Negative Campaigning

Canada's first national referendum since the conscription debacle of 1942 marked the arrival of no-holds-barred negative campaigning. Parliamentary elections in the past have produced heated exchanges, as in the case of the 1984 and 1988 federal leadership debates. Just the same, Canadians assume that the crass manipulation that is associated with US politics—the negative advertising and smear tactics—does not apply to us.

The images of the referendum, however, were overwhelmingly negative and confrontational. By the end of the campaign, the negativity of the Yes campaign would be indelibly imprinted on the public's mind—through the prime minister's histrionics, and an advertising campaign that included images of, among other things, a stove-top pot boiling over.

Opponents of the Accord also employed a rhetoric that preyed on fear. Canadians were told not only that new social programs would be impossible, but also that existing programs were threatened by the Accord. In addition, Canadians were told that the Canada clause would destroy their rights under the Charter. And PQ leader Parizeau displayed a post-Charlottetown map showing most of the province being ceded to aboriginal peoples.

One might expect debate on proposals for constitutional reform to be more rational and reasoned than a fight for office between candidates who are openly competing with each other. Precisely because the referendum was about issues, none of the ethics that restrain debate during a parliamentary campaign applied. In the end, credibility imposed the only limit on debate about the Accord.

Only a few months ago, restrictions on referendum campaigning had been demanded to protect the "fairness" of the process. Many now argue that the civic participation triggered by the Accord was one of the healthiest developments in the history of Canadian democracy. Can it seriously be argued, after the Accord, that restrictions on third-party participation and expenditures are necessary to protect the integrity of the democratic process?

Political Action Committees and Democratic Participation

In Canada it is widely believed that the 1988 federal election was bought by money—specifically, free enterprise money that supported the free trade agreement. This year, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform (the Lortie Commission) responded to that perception with recommendations that would impose strict limits on campaign expenditures, including a $1,000 limit on third-party participation. The purpose of these restrictions is to promote the "meaningful exercise of the rights and freedoms essential to a healthy electoral democracy."

The Lortie Commission's recommendations rest on two assumptions, each of which has been undermined, if not disproved, by the national referendum. First, the commission assumed that money buys votes: "unrestricted freedom to express political views during a campaign cannot prevent some electoral communications from overwhelming the communications of others, *thereby advantaging one political point of view*" (emphasis added).

According to projections, the Canada Yes Committee expected to spend $7.8 million on the campaign. Outside Quebec, the scattered and ideologically diverse forces of the No campaign could not begin to match the resources of the Yes campaign. And the result? A negative correlation between campaign expenditures and the referendum vote.

Nor can Canada's referendum experience be dismissed as purely fortuitous: two weeks later, the US presidential election revealed a similar pattern. There, Democrat Bill Clinton prevailed against disproportionate campaign spending by both opponents, President Bush and challenger Perot.

Second, the Lortie Commission noted that "the principal means whereby Canadians actively participate in elections is as supporters of candidates and members of political parties." In making that statement, the commission assumed that demo-

cratic participation in Canada should be defined in terms of affiliation with parties and their candidates. The role of non-partisan, third-party participation was accordingly reflected in the commission's proposal to limit independent party expenditures to $1,000.

On this point, the referendum campaign is once again instructive. The Canada Committee was organized and directed by a tri-partite coalition of the federal parties, with disastrous consequences. Far more successful were the ad hoc "political action committees" that, in many cases, were citizen-based or otherwise formed by interest group organizations.

It surely remains open to question whether, and to what degree, the referendum experience translates into the traditional process of parliamentary election. But this much is clear: it can no longer be assumed that money buys elections. Nor can it be assumed that restrictions on non-partisan civic participation enhance, rather than diminish, the fairness of the democratic process. As significant as the Accord's defeat may be for the future of constitutional reform, its broader implications for Canada's political culture may ultimately be more important.

Jamie Cameron is Associate Professor and Assistant Dean at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Legal Report is a regular feature of Canada Watch.

Canada Watch Calendar

October 1	Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau blasts the Yes side at Maison du Egg Roll in Montreal.
October 7	Premier Clyde Wells tours western Canada for Yes side.
October 8	Television advertising campaign begins.
	BC Constitutional Affairs Minister Moe Sihota claims that English Canadian premiers "stared down" Premier Robert Bourassa.
October 12	Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa and PQ leader Jacques Parizeau engage in televised debate.
October 16	*L'Actualité* publishes memos of Quebec civil servants claiming that Quebec lost in the negotiations.
October 18	Assembly of First Nations' chiefs refuse to endorse the Accord.
October 22	Elijah Harper urges natives to boycott the referendum.
	Yes side advertising campaign becomes more aggressive.
October 23	Reform Party convention begins in Winnipeg.
October 24	Toronto Blue Jays win the World Series.
October 26	National Referendum results — No: 53.7%; Yes: 45.2%.
October 29	Federal task force issues report on economic development and prosperity.
October 30	PEI Premier Joe Ghiz announces his resignation.
November 3	Bill Clinton defeats George Bush in the US presidential elections.
November 16	New session of House of Commons to commence.
November 19-20	Quebec government retreat to consider constitutional options in the light of the failure of the Charlottetown Accord.
November 24	Quebec National Assembly resumes sitting.
November 28	Initial voting in Alberta Progressive Conservative leadership contest.
December 5	Run-off vote in Alberta Tory leadership contest, if necessary.
December 17	Scheduled signing of legal text of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by Presidents Bush and Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney.